Towards International Competition Rules? by Brorsson, Charlotte
Towards International Competition Rules?                                                                       Charlotte Brorsson   
 1
 
Juridiska Institutionen 
Göteborgs universitet 
Jur.kand.programmet 
Tillämpade studier 20p. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Towards International 
Competition 
Rules? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       
Charlotte Brorsson 
 
      
      
           Handledare: Per Cramér 
   
 
 
Towards International Competition Rules?                                                                       Charlotte Brorsson   
 2
Abstract 
 
 
The ongoing trade liberalisation has reduced tariffs and barriers to trade 
significantly and has opened up markets to foreign actors. The globalisation has in 
the same time increased the effects of the trade liberalisation by the disappearance 
of national borders and the facilitation of cross-border transactions. The debate of 
further international cooperation in the field of competition is based on the fear 
that the effects of the trade liberalisation will be consumed by governmental and 
private anticompetitive behaviour, which will constitute new forms of barriers. 
Admittedly, nations have a tendency to direct their behaviour by mainly national 
welfare considerations and this increases the likelihood that nations use 
anticompetitive practices to limit the result of the trade liberalisation. After all, 
competition is a means to attain higher national economic efficiency and this 
makes the fear of rent shifting practices even more justified. The inability of 
nations to evaluate their actions in a wider spectrum, and to work towards global 
welfare as the predominant goal, makes the process towards any convergence of 
nations’ competition laws very difficult and time-consuming. The process is also 
complicated by the different positions the US and the EC, the two largest 
economies in the world, have taken. The consequence has been a polarised debate 
with, on the one hand the far reaching approach of the EC, which is opting for the 
adoption of some core principles within the WTO, and on the other hand the more 
limited view of the US, which believes the best way to achieve international 
convergence in competition matters is by voluntary bilateral agreements.   
 
The standpoint is taken from the cases Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and 
GE/Honeywell. The cases illustrate the possibility to arbitrarily take into 
consideration industrial policy reasons but openly defend this by the application 
of the nation’s competition law. Not saying this was the case in the two mergers, 
even if some authors are of that opinion, it is obvious that differences in 
competition authorities’ assessment may constitute a protectionistic measure or at 
least provoke accusation of protectionism. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Objectives 
The intention with this essay was initially to analyse whether nations could use their 
competition law arbitrarily so as to compensate from the losses the trade liberalisation may 
cause. After consulting the literature I noticed that this debate was already going on to a 
certain extent and that the topic was awarded more and more attention from scholars and 
debaters alike. There was a growing literature on the subject, which consisted mostly of 
materials from different international organisations and other types of articles. It required a lot 
of research to find the relevant material and for this research process I had the advantage to be 
able to use the library of the European Court of Justice. It was mostly there I found the articles 
mentioned above. I have also used data from electronic media, literature presented in books, 
and articles in newspapers. The legal sources examined are statues and regulations, 
recommendations and guidelines of relevance and authority, judicial decisions and 
international agreements of both bilateral and multilateral character.  
 
1.2 Delimitation and overview  
There are some disadvantages with the material for someone writing an essay with a limited 
number of pages; most of the material tries to deal with all possible anticompetitive behaviour 
without concentrating on one or two restraints to competition and trade. When attempts to 
have a more limited scope of the analysis were done, they (not surprisingly considering their 
relevance to trade) mostly concentrated on export cartels and issues of market access. 
Relatively little was mentioned specifically about anticompetitive mergers, despite the 
obvious international effects such transactions can have. Even if the deserved attention has 
been given to the two high profile merger-cases of Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and 
GE/Honeywell, which showed that nations’ competitive assessment may differ and thereby 
cause different outcomes in different jurisdictions, the debate has mainly been on whether the 
world needs international competition rules or not. Given the legitimacy of this question and 
since it is important to have a general overview of the problems of governmental and private 
restraints to trade, the essay starts with identifying some of these anticompetitive practices.   
 
While appreciating the ambition to try to identify all possible anticompetitive behaviour with 
negative impact on trade and possible ways to deal with these problems on the international 
arena, I have chosen to focus on anticompetitive mergers with cross-border effects. This 
choice is based partly because anticompetitive mergers are not as well covered as other forms 
of behaviour that impede competition, and partly because mergers with transnational effects 
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have increased the last couple of years, and is expected to increase even more as business seek 
to gain market shares abroad.   
 
The standpoint is taken from the cases mentioned above, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and 
GE/Honeywell. The cases illustrate the possibility to arbitrarily take into consideration 
industrial policy reasons but openly defend this by the application of the nation’s competition 
law. Not saying this was the case in the two mergers, even if some authors are of that opinion, 
it is obvious that differences in competition authorities’ assessment may constitute a 
protectionistic measure or at least provoke accusation of protectionism.   
 
The second part of the essay will concentrate on the work done so far, both bilaterally and 
multilaterally, to achieve further convergence in competition matters. The most 
comprehensive discussion has occurred within the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which 
has established a Working Group with the aim to study the relationship between competition 
policy and trade policy. Even if the discussion in the Working Group is on a general basis 
there are many voices opting for a multilateral agreement on international competition policy 
within the WTO. The arguments for and against a multilateral agreement and if the WTO is 
the best forum to host such an agreement will also be discussed. In relation to this it is 
necessary to describe the close relationship between competition policy and trade policy that 
exists, in order to understand the ongoing discussion of international competition rules. 
 
Finally, I intend to account for alternative solutions and proposals that have been advanced by 
scholars and debaters. They provide a useful input to the overall discussion because they are 
not constrained by political or institutional consideration, even if the proposals here are 
limited to what one can expect to be a realistic approach. 
 
1.3 Definitions 
Two of the reasons why conflicts over competition matter occur between nations are the 
differences in the competitive analysis in different jurisdictions and that those nations’ 
competition laws are differently formulated. Even where nations have identically worded 
provisions differences remain because the words are interpreted differently. Example of terms 
that are given different meaning in different contexts and in different jurisdictions are 
“anticompetitive behaviour” and “abuse of competition”. These general concepts will be used 
in the essay often without being more precisely specified. However, it should be recognised 
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that practices such as certain horizontal agreements, vertical restrictions and arrangements, 
practices by dominant firms and mergers with international impact can but do not necessarily 
have anticompetitive effects. It is not sure that these types of conduct always have 
international effects. Sometimes they may affect both competition and international trade but 
in other instances they will have neither impact on either competition nor trade.  
 
Two other terms that need to be clarified for the purpose of this essay are the concept of 
competition law and competition policy. I will throughout the essay use these terms 
interchangeable, even if it can be argued that competition policy has a broader scope. 
Competition policy may comprise the full range of government measures that affect market 
structure and conduct and it has been argued that nations can be committed to competition 
policy but still not have a comprehensive competition law. The terms are often mixed in the 
literature and in this essay the two terms will be given the same implication.1    
 
In the debate of a multilateral agreement on competition law a lot has concerned the issue of 
harmonisation. Any form of multilateral agreement would inevitably result in some 
convergence and it is important to understand that it exists different levels of harmonisation. 
Depending on what one includes in the word harmonisation the possibility to reach some form 
of agreement on competition policy enhances or reduces. If one speaks of a rigid form of 
harmonisation, where common rules are enforced by common institutions and where little is 
left for the individual nation to regulate, there will never be a multilateral agreement on 
competition policy. In contrast, the lowest form of harmonisation, so called soft 
harmonisation occurs by informal means, e.g. in workshops, where ideas between nations’ 
competition officials are shared and discussed, and by issuing guidelines and 
recommendations. In the long-term such soft harmonisation is thought to yield further 
convergence and cooperation between nations. The rigid form of harmonisation is not a 
realistic approach when discussing the establishment of international competition rules and 
will therefore not be referred to in the essay. Moreover, if the intention is to indicate soft 
harmonisation this will be specified. Besides those exceptions the term harmonisation or 
convergence will be used generally and could indicate any level at the scale of harmonisation. 
 
 
                                                          
1 WT/WGTCP/2, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition 
Policy, para. 37 
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Part 1 
 
2. The need for an international competition policy 
2.1 Introduction 
The ongoing trade liberalisation has reduced tariffs and barriers to trade significantly and has 
opened up markets to foreign actors. The globalisation has in the same time increased the 
effects of the trade liberalisation by the disappearance of national borders and the facilitation 
of cross-border transactions. The debate of further international cooperation in the field of 
competition is based on the fear that the effects of the trade liberalisation will be consumed by 
governmental and private anticompetitive behaviour, which will constitute new forms of 
barriers. Admittedly, nations have a tendency to direct their behaviour by mainly national 
welfare considerations and this increases the likelihood that nations use anticompetitive 
practices to limit the result of the trade liberalisation. After all, competition is a means to 
attain higher national economic efficiency and this makes the fear of rent shifting practices 
even more justified. The inability of nations to evaluate their actions in a wider spectrum, and 
to work towards global welfare as the predominant goal, makes the process towards any 
convergence of nations’ competition law very difficult and time-consuming. The process is 
also complicated by the different positions the US and the EC, the two largest economies in 
the world, have taken. The consequence has been a polarised debate with, on the one hand the 
far reaching approach of the EC, which is opting for the adoption of some core principles 
within the WTO, and on the other hand the more limited view of the US, which believes the 
best way to achieve international convergence in competition matters is by voluntary bilateral 
agreements.   
 
        2.1.1 Governmental anticompetitive practices that impede trade 
As indicated in the introduction, governments may wish to apply their competition law so as 
to compensate for the effects of the trade liberalisation. This could be manifested by a lack of 
competition laws or non-enforcement of existing competition laws but it is also possible that 
the enactment of regional and national competition regimes could be formulated with the 
intention to increase the nation’s trade shares on behalf of other trading partners. This would 
be the case if the competition rules protected the domestic market from anticompetitive 
practices but at the same time were used to camouflage protectionism; that is to prevent 
foreign firms access to the local market, or provide foreign enterprises different conditions 
than domestic ones when conducting business on the domestic market.  
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There is also a suspicion among many governments that other governments intend to use their 
competition law arbitrarily as a trade weapon2, a suspicion that one might believe to be, to a 
certain extent, based on the fundamental differences that exist in nations’ competition laws. 
Even when no such difference exists, rules will be interpreted differently and even a word 
such as anticompetitive is given different meanings. Governments as well as private business 
might regard the application of a nation’s competition rules as based on pure national welfare 
considerations, because the assessment of a transaction is viewed differently in jurisdictions 
others than their own. This problem could arise in other areas of law which have transnational 
dimensions, but it is argued that the globalisation and the ongoing trade liberalisation create 
further implications in competition law issues, both because of their economic impact and the 
large number of transactions. It is also a fairly new area of law where more and more nations 
enact competition laws. Another problem relating to anticompetitive behaviour of 
governments is that governments often use their sovereignty as a defence and hide behind this 
notion when they take anticompetitive actions. It has therefore been argued that the concept of 
sovereignty is overused and misused, especially in international competition matters.3  
 
       2.1.2 Beggar-thy-neighbour approach   
The practices mentioned above are clear examples of a beggar-thy-neighbour approach. Such 
conduct, which emphasises national welfare as the sole objective of governments, is not 
anything new in trade policies and in a competition law context there are several examples of 
how nations have tried to increase national welfare by facilitating export cartels and mergers 
to monopoly when most of the buying power is situated abroad. A beggar-thy-neighbour 
conduct is a short-term strategy but which non-the-less causes severe impediments to trade. 
Usually such measures result in a downward spiral where nations impose retaliatory measures 
to distort the first nation’s restraints to trade and competition. These issues have been subject 
to many agreements, particularly within the General Agreement on Trade (GATT), succeeded 
by the WTO, and several successful steps have been taken regarding government imposed 
quotas, tariffs, anti-dumping actions and Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs).4 As will be 
seen later in the essay a lot of progress towards international competition policy could be 
achieved if nations did not have this “vision problem”. 
                                                          
2 D. Voillemot & A. Thiller, WTO and competition rules, (1999) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 31 at p. 44 
 (B. Hawk ed.) 
3 E. Fox and J. A. Ordover, The Harmonization of Competition and Trade Law – The case for modest linkages of 
law and the limits to parochial state action, Competition Policy in the Global Economy – Modalities for 
cooperation p. 407 at 429 (1997, L. Waverman, W. S. Comanor and A. Goto ed.) 
4 Ibid, p. 416  
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       2.1.3 Regulatory competition and a race-to-the-bottom 
In line with the above lies the theory of regulatory competition and a race-to-the-bottom. 
Regulatory competition can be explained by the possibility for nations to use their laws to 
attract trade and, in order to take away profit from their neighbours, nations will degrade their 
laws. A race-to-the-bottom assumes that nations compete against each other in writing their 
laws and in the application of the provisions, so as to be more attractive for business than 
other nations. The theory has been discussed mainly in the area of environmental law and 
there it seems to be applicable. However, in regard to competition law, the theory is not as 
applicable since it is not always one nation’s competition law that will be applied when 
evaluating anticompetitive conduct in a state. If the practice is taking place outside the 
territory of that state but has effects within it, the state will usually have jurisdiction over the 
case. Multinational enterprises will also be scrutinised by several nations’ competition 
authorities as they choose to enter a market. Such market entry will probably occur despite lax 
or rigid enforcement of competition rules as long as the cost for applying to a nation’s 
competition law will not be too burdensome.  
 
Professor Fox has discussed regulatory competition in antitrust matters. She provides the 
following example based on an antitrust system that business, consumers and governments 
regard as good antitrust system. As she is well aware of “good” antitrust law cannot 
objectively be defined but the US might regard competition rules that promote efficiency as a 
good antitrust system. The business community would also regard efficiency gains as the 
optimum and in such a scenario nations that have an efficiency based antitrust law will attract 
business, at least those businesses that are confident they can survive on their own merits. 
Since the notion of “good” antitrust law is subjective, other nations will have other definitions 
for what is good competition law. The EC and those countries that have similar competition 
laws will perhaps regard competition law that prohibits abuse-of-dominance as the best law 
for them. However, if businesses are guided by efficiency gains, the US efficiency based law 
could trigger a race-to-the-bottom; i.e. other countries would have to degrade their law so as 
not disadvantage their own business in the world competition.5 It is thus possible that 
conflicts between jurisdictions, like the ones illustrated in the already mentioned 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell, could be a result of the use of regulatory 
competition. However, it is not very likely that the US approved the mergers out of the wish 
                                                          
5 E. Fox, Global Antitrust from a U.S. Perspective, p. 217 at. 225f , 2002, Europa und die Globalisierung- 
Referate des Zweiten Wiener Globalisierungs, (C. Baudenbacher & E. Busek ed.)  
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to attract business and investment. The discussion seems in most part as very abstract. 
Professor Fox may find some support of the fact that the European competition law has 
approached itself to the US standard but if this has anything to do with a race-to-the-bottom is 
hard to tell. It is argued that if US efficiency based antitrust law would attract business, the 
efficiency gains must be defined identically for both business and competition authorities. It is 
difficult to see that an efficiency based antitrust law always will reconcile with the interest of 
businesses, hence the wish to maximise profits, while the antitrust provisions will intervene 
and to certain extent try to limit the behaviour of businesses, even if it applies an efficiency 
based competition law.  
 
       2.1.4 A world welfare standard 
Instead of favouring a national welfare approach the governments might consider a world 
welfare standard, which has been defined as the “aggregate level of consumer benefits and 
profits realised by consumers and firms in all pertinent countries”.6 It has been suggested that 
one way to accomplish a world welfare standard is to specify that a government is prohibited 
to act when the negative consequences from such practices outweighs the benefits of 
correcting market failure or protecting a national interest. A difficulty with this approach is to 
find the adequate and necessary information and to objectively assess it, in order to determine 
what acts should be prohibited in a specific case. Another possible approach to reach a world 
welfare standard is to indicate a scale of permissible or less permissible actions. At one end of 
the hierarchy it could be permissible behaviour to cure market failures within the state, such 
as pollution. At the other end of the scale could be policies that have as their sole goal to shift 
profits from foreign firms to national firms, which would be regarded as impermissible. 
However, it might be difficult to find out the true reason for a nation’s policy and all policies 
can always be deemed to include several objectives. Both approaches have been said to be 
workable, in order to offer a world welfare model, subject to proper scope for national and 
local autonomy.7 
 
2.2 Private barriers to trade  
Although tremendous efforts are still required to abolish governmental trade barriers, a lot has 
already been done to reduce tariffs and other governmental barriers to trade. The debate has 
therefore more and more turned to the question of how to best regulate trade barriers created 
through restrictive business practices of private firms. The agreements of GATT and WTO 
                                                          
6 E. Fox and J. A. Ordover, as note 3 above, p. 416 
7 Ibid, p. 417  
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are mainly concerned with trade barriers imposed by governments even if some latter 
agreements have included provisions concerning both private and public practices.8 While 
governmental trade barriers primarily are concerned with tariffs or lax enforcement to the 
benefit of the domestic nation, private barriers can exist of market-sharing agreements, 
vertical restraints to exclude foreign competitors, export cartels or merger to monopoly. Such 
non-tariff barriers to trade often have more severe consequences to consumers than old-
fashioned tariffs because they are less transparent and more costly. Private anticompetitive 
behaviour can be supported or encouraged by governments (but might as well be purely 
private restraints to competition) and will then be on the borderline between private and 
governmental restraint to trade and competition. The above mentioned practices are also clear 
examples of restraints with transnational effects. 
 
It has been argued that a harmonised competition law would reduce anticompetitive practices 
by private firms and in the same time provide advantages for them. A clear benefit of a 
harmonised competition law is the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade and a limitation of 
the pressure from private business on governments to obtain special treatment. Such pressure 
is often hard for governments to resist since nations compete for foreign direct investments 
and increased trade. The use of common principles or provisions for the assessment of 
competition matters would also simplify the business planning for enterprises and possibly 
generate efficiency gains.9 
 
       2.2.1 Anticompetitive mergers  
Anticompetitive mergers, which is one type of private barrier, might not have as a direct link 
to trade as for example export cartels. However, the pre-notification system in merger reviews 
prevents many anticompetitive transactions from occurring in the first place and it is therefore 
difficult to more precisely analyse the potential consequences on trade of anticompetitive 
mergers. Generally two types of anticompetitive effects have been recognised to arise in 
mergers between competitors. One is a reduction of competition through coordinated 
interaction and/or a lessing of competition through unilateral trade. The result would thus be 
higher prices for the consumers and/or reduced output so the customers that desired to 
purchase the product at competitive prices would be hindered to do so.10 However, even if the 
negative consequences of an anticompetitive merger are recognised, the transaction will often 
                                                          
8 For example Article IX of GATS, the Telecommunication Annex of the GATS and Article 40 of  TRIPS 
9 E. Fox and J. A. Ordover, as note 3 above, p. 408 
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be permitted or escape the scrutiny of nations’ merger regulations. International mergers also 
rise other issues, e.g. matters of procedure and cooperation between nations’ competition 
authorities, which will be described below.   
 
In a merger context, the problem is usually not the lack of competition laws prohibiting 
anticompetitive mergers but that some nations allow their competition authorities to take into 
consideration industrial policy reasons. The most common industrial policy reason is the 
willingness to save jobs and to create national champions. Michael Porter has described the 
national champion notion as the willingness to let a firm grow in size in order to compete 
more effectively in international markets.11 The creation of a national champion might 
enhance the merged firm’s possibility to exploit the world market. Moreover, merger laws are 
similarly drafted around the world but the methodologies and analysis differs sometimes 
substantially. I will return to this question later on, when comparing the antitrust laws of the 
US and the EU. 
 
Another problem is that a merger between firms from two countries, or even in the same 
country, may have anticompetitive effects in other jurisdictions. This enhances the likelihood 
for the merger to be reviewed by multiple jurisdictions, which is both time-consuming and 
costly. It is also feared that a multi- jurisdictional review will be a too heavy burden on the 
parties involved in the transaction so that they feel obliged to abandon an agreement that 
would have been beneficial for the consumers.12 Even if a merger has procompetitive effects 
in several jurisdictions, a single competition authority may still prohibit it because in that 
territory it has anticompetitive effects. This is a risk with multiple assessments. The problems 
occur when the merger in its total enhances world welfare but the benefits are widely 
dispersed over the globe. Governments, often pressured from domestic lobbying, tend to 
prohibit the transaction because of the negative consequences on their market even if the 
benefits in an overall perspective might outweigh these negative effects. In these cases, 
international competition rules could be beneficial if they stipulate that practice which 
promote efficiency, by e.g. promoting research and development, sustainable cross-border 
low pricing or alliances, which involves high technology investments, should be allowed 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 WT/WGTCP/W/66, Communication from the US, 26 March 1998  
11 M. E. Porter, (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 3rd edition 
12 J. F. Rill and C.C. Wilson, Selected recommendations for substantive and procedural convergence in the 
multi-jurisdictional merger context, (1999) Fordham Corp. L. Inst. 359 at p. 361 (B. Hawk ed.)  
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despite the negative consequences in a single nation.13 How this will work in practice is 
however hard to tell. Nations’ competition authority cannot be expected to assess all possible 
effects on competition on a worldwide level. This would be time consuming and the 
authorities would not have the necessary resources for the task. It will only be a realistic 
solution if competition cases with transnational effects are assessed by a multilateral 
authority, e.g. the WTO, which more easily could make an “international review” of the cases. 
However, nations would then have to limit their sovereignty. As will be seen in part three, 
there has been suggested that a WTO premerger office should be established with the aim to 
identify the transactions that have effects in several jurisdictions. Such a body could then also 
analyse the effects in an overall worldwide perspective.   
 
In analogy with the reasoning above, regarding a world welfare standard, the permissible 
conduct that could yield efficiency gains on the world market needs to be specified in detail 
so as not open up for abuses. Another possible approach in these situations and to which I will 
return to later, could be for nations to use jurisdictional discretion and refrain from actions 
when the negative consequences on the domestic market are less significant than the world 
wide benefits. 
 
Multiple notifications may also lead to international disagreements over the extraterritorial 
limits of national jurisdiction, attempts to collect information outside the nation’s territory and 
the right remedy to alter anticompetitive aspects of the transaction. There is a risk that the 
legal uncertainty will increase as a consequence of the multiple assertions in different 
jurisdictions when they all apply inconsistent legal standards and different remedies.14 Some 
of the issues mentioned above can be illustrated by the two high-profile cases, 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell. Both cases raises issues of jurisdiction, 
differences in the competitive analysis between nations’ merger regulations (especially 
regarding the different economic interests and more specifically the issue of efficiency gains), 
cooperation between competition authorities and political interference. However, before an 
analysis of Boeing/McDonnel Douglas and GE/Honeywell is undertaken, it would be useful 
to account for the competition laws of the US and the EU, and the underlying economic 
theories that have influenced these laws.  
 
                                                          
13 E. Fox and J. A. Ordover, as note 3 above, p. 417  
14 J.P. Griffin, Antitrust Aspect of Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions [1998] E.C.L.R., issue 1, p. 12 
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2.3 The application of EC and US competition rules        2.3.1 Article 81 
Article 81(1) prohibits agreements, decisions and concerted practice between undertakings 
that have as their object or effect to distort competition and which may affect trade between 
Member States. The article does not distinguish between horizontal agreement and 
agreements between firms operating at different levels of trade. Even though the article 
distinguishes between agreements, decisions and concerted practices the difference between 
them are not always clear-cut and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has in complicated 
cases held it to be enough to find a combination of the different forms of cooperation that has 
resulted in systematic collusion.15  
 
Article 81(1) will only apply to agreements that prevent, restrict or distort competition 
appreciably. The requirement of appreciable effect relates mostly to the parties market shares 
as well as to the size of the parties involved in the transaction. It is therefore necessary to 
undertake a comprehensive economic analysis in order to determine whether the agreement 
satisfies the requirement of appreciable effect on competition or trade between Member 
States.16 The agreements must have the object or effect of restricting competition within the 
Common Market for article 81(1) to apply. The object or effect of an agreement must be 
evaluated in its economic and legal context, in the light of the relevant market, and with 
consideration to the parties’ individual competitive conditions, and the conditions of market 
entry.  
 
Article 81(2) provides that agreements that are in violation of article 81(1) are void. However, 
an agreement that is prohibited under article 81(1) can still be permitted if they fall under a 
block exemption in accordance with article 81(3). For article 81(3) to apply, the net effect of 
the agreement must be beneficial, not only to the parties involved but to the general welfare. 
Price fixing, quota setting and markets sharing will normally not meet the requirements for an 
exemption under the article.17 The Commission has the sole authority and broad discretion to 
grant a block exemption.18 As a consequence, the Commission has been able to take into 
consideration issues of development and research, specialisation production, licensing of 
                                                          
15 Hercules v. Commission, Case T-7/89, 17.12.1991, (1991) II ECR 1711, para. 264 
16 D. Hildebrand, (2002) The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, 2nd edition, pp. 31-32 
17 Circumstances that are regarded by the Commission as beneficial to consumers are higher quality of the 
products offered, introduction of new and improved products, more favourable prices, greater range of goods, 
lower costs and thereby lower cost for customers. J. Faull/A. Nikpay (1999) The EC Law of Competition, p. 103. 
 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p 35. 
18 Article 9(1) of Regulation 17, which apply both to individual exemption as well as to block exemptions. 
Towards International Competition Rules?                                                                       Charlotte Brorsson   
 17
intellectual property and know-how. The Commission has, when granting individual 
exemptions and block exemptions, favoured small and medium-sized firms while agreements 
between large undertakings have been regarded with much more scepticism. However, it 
seems like the Commission in recent years has permitted more agreements between large 
enterprises than before, especially when those companies were subject to competition from 
large firms established outside the EC.19 
        
       2.3.2 Article 82 
Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position by one or more firms in a substantial part of 
the Common Market that may affect trade between member states. The article enumerates 
certain conducts that are considered as an abuse without being exhaustive. The mentioned 
abuses can be divided into three main categories, exploitative abuses, exclusionary abuses and 
structural abuses. Exploitative abuses are practices that exploit market power in a trading 
relationship with customers by, e.g. unfair purchase or selling prices or price discrimination. 
Structural abuses are a behaviour that eliminates a competitor by e.g. a merger or an 
acquisition, and exclusionary abuses are refusal to deal or other predatory actions.20 
 
A firm holding a dominant position is only to a limited extent exposed to competition and has 
therefore no incentive to improve the overall performance by means of cost reductions or 
increased innovations. This enables the firm to behave independently and in a way that may 
harm other market participants. The possibility to act rather unconstrained from its 
competitors was emphasised by the Court of Justice in the United Brand case. The Court 
defined a dominant position of a firm as “ a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on the 
relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
its competitors, its consumers and ultimately of the consumers.”21  
 
The determination of whether a firm holds a dominant position depends to a large extent on 
the structure of the market and both the geographic and the product market needs to be 
evaluated. The main criteria that are considered when assessing dominance are the firm’s 
market shares compared to its rivals, the degree of dependence of its customers or suppliers 
                                                          
19 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p 36. 
20 L. Ritter, W. D. Braun, F. Rawlinson, (2000) European  Competition Law; A Practitioner's Guide, 2nd edition, 
p. 328 
21 United Brands v. Commission, (27/76) ECJ Feb. 14 1978, 1978 ECR 207, para 65 
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and the possibility to decide its prices and conditions of sale without serious regard to the 
competitive response of other firms.22   
 
It should be underlined that a dominant position does not in itself raise any objections for the 
application of article 82. It is the abuse of an already existing dominant position that the 
article attempts to regulate. However, if firms obtain a dominant position by coordination of 
their conduct or through mergers article 82 or the EC Merger Regulation will be infringed.23  
 
Firms that collectively hold a dominant position may violate article 82 if the enterprises 
forming the oligopoly are connected by structural links. Such links includes shareholdings, 
technology, production and marketing arrangements and exchange of sensitive information 
between them.24 
 
       2.3.3 The EC Merger Regulation   
The EC Merger Regulation 4064/89, was adopted on December 21 1989, and entered into 
force nine months later. It was later amended by Regulation 1310/97. The two regulations are 
based on article 83 and 308 of the EC Treaty. While article 83 permits the Council to legislate 
on conduct that falls within article 81 and article 82, article 308 allows the Council to take 
action not provided for in the Treaty if this is deemed necessary to obtain the objectives of the 
Treaty, including the maintenance of effective competition in the Common Market (article 
3(g)).25 Article 83 would in itself have been insufficient to regulate mergers since they 
sometimes fall outside the application of article 81 and article 82. Especially mergers, which 
created a dominant position, used to cause difficulties. However, until the Merger Regulation 
entered into force, article 82 and less often article 81 were applied to mergers. 
 
The Merger Regulation is limited to mergers and joint ventures with a Community dimension. 
The notion of Community dimension aims at dividing the competence between national 
competition authorities and the Commission. Only transactions with a Community dimension 
will be assessed by the Commission, subject to a few exemptions26. The national authorities 
have competence to deal with a transaction with no Community dimension but may refer the 
                                                          
22 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p. 46 
23 Ibid, p. 41 
24 L. Ritter, W. D. Braun, F. Rawlinson, as not 20 above, p 314 
25 Recitals 6-8 of the preamble to Regulation 4064/89 
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case to the Commission for a decision.27 The Commission does also have the possibility to 
refer a case to the national authority in accordance with article 9(3), as amended by 
Regulation 1310/97. 
 
If the firms involved in the transaction have a Community dimension the Commission will 
evaluate whether the merger or joint venture create or strengthen a dominant position that 
would significantly impede effective competition.28 Both conditions need to be established in 
order for the Commission to prevent the transaction. The transaction will not cause any 
concerns in the view of the Merger Regulation if the dominant position does not have any 
negative consequences in the Common Market. In determining whether the merger will create 
or strengthen a dominant position, the relevant product and geographic market must be 
analysed. The market definition is to a large extent the same as under article 81 or article 82, 
and is defined in the Commission's Notice on the Relevant Market for the Purposes of 
Community Law.29 As the Common Market has become further integrated the relevant 
geographic market has been defined more broadly. The Commission indicated in its Notice on 
the Definition of the Relevant Market that the European market integration will be considered 
when defining the relevant market.30 It is to be expected that the ongoing globalisation will 
broaden the assessment of the relevant geographic market. 
 
The size of the firms’ market shares in relation to their competitors will be regarded as a 
crucial criterion when determining if a merger creates or strengthens a dominant position. The 
Commission will compare the post-merger’s market shares with those of its actual and 
potential competitors.31 However, not only the market shares will be taken into account in the 
assessment. Other factors that will be considered are e.g. the financial power of the parties 
and the competitors, alternatives available to suppliers and users, market entry barriers, supply 
and demand trends, and the development of technical and economic progress. This evaluation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 According to art. 21(3) of the Merger Regulation, the member states may take appropriate actions to protect 
public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules, and other unspecified public interest that are 
recognised by the Commission after the notification by the member state.  
27 Article 22(3) Merger Regulation 4064/89  
28 Article 2 of the Merger Regulation 4064/89. 
29 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purpose of Community competition law 
[1997] OJ C372/5, [1998] 4 CMLR 177 
30 L. Ritter, W. D. Braun, F. Rawlinson, as note 20 above, pp. 453-454  
31 V. Korah, (2000) An introductory guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, 7th edition, p. 309 
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must be made both with respect to the relevant product market as well as to the relevant 
geographic market.32  
 
       2.3.4 The US antitrust law 
The US has a strong policy against mergers that have anticompetitive effects. It was also the 
first country to adopt a modern system of competition law with the enactment of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890, of which the two basic provisions still remain the basis of current law.33 
The Sherman Act, under sections 1 and 2, forbids horizontal mergers if the result of the 
merger would be the elimination of competition between them. In assessing the legality of the 
horizontal merger under the Sherman Act the courts will examine market share, the degree of 
concentration, the harm to other competitors and the effects on competition. If the result of the 
merger would be a significant increase in the concentration of firms in the relevant market and 
the merged firm has an undue percentage of that market the merger will be banned.  
 
New legislation was passed in the years and decades after the Sherman Act. Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act was passed 1917 and it prohibits acquisitions that substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly. The provision was later amended by the Celler-
Kefauver Act to apply to asset as well as stock acquisition, and thereby mergers explicitly. 
Section 7 of the amended Clayton Act provides that no firm shall acquire any of the stock or 
assets of any other firm if the result will be to substantially reduce competition or to tend to 
create a monopoly. In 1976, section 7A of the Clayton Act was enacted by the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, which established the requirement of pre-merger 
notifications.34  
 
The antitrust division has a tradition of issuing various guidelines in the field of merger 
policy. Even though decision of the courts may differ from the issued guidelines, the proposed 
standard shows the policy in merger cases for a considerable period. The merger guidelines 
are mostly designed as an analytical help in assessing whether a merger is likely to 
substantially lessen competition. The approach taken in the 1992 Merger Guidelines35 is that 
the analysis of a merger should start with deciding the relevant market and then assess the 
competitive effects of the merger mainly from the resulting changes in market shares. The 
                                                          
32 L. Ritter, W. D. Braun, F. Rawlinson, as note 20 above, p. 470 
33 A. Jones, B. Sufrin, Text, (2001) Cases and Materials, EC Competition Law, p. 18 
34 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p. 90f 
35 The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines [with April 8,1997, Revisions to Section 4 on Efficiencies] 
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part about efficiencies was revised in 1997. Efficiency gains, which is a result of a merger and 
which would not have been achieved in the absence of such a transaction, is called merger-
specific efficiencies. It has been found by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that certain 
efficiencies are more likely to be substantial than others are and thereby less likely to result 
from anticompetitive behaviour. For example, efficiencies related to management, 
procurement or capital costs are less likely to be substantial, while efficiencies from shifting 
of production among facilities formerly owned separately, and those efficiencies relating to 
research and development costs are likely to be regarded as merger-specific.36 
 
 2.4 The economics behind the competition laws 
 “Competition policy is an economic policy concerned with economic structures, economic 
conduct, and economic effects”.37 Consequently, in order to fully understand a nation’s 
competition policy, it is important to study the economic theories behind it. However, there 
are a lot of disagreements between the economists on the details of the theories and this has 
resulted in many different thought of schools.38 Even if it would be a desirable aim to describe 
all the existing competition theories, it would go beyond the scope of this essay. The intention 
is instead to account for the most influential theories for the development of the different 
competition policies of the US and the EC.  
 
The scholars have, since Adam Smith presented his free market theory, discussed the proper 
economic analysis that should be applied in the field of competition. The question that the 
theories attempt to answer is how to achieve the best balance between the firm’s desire to 
maximise its profits and other policy interests, e.g. the interest of the consumers to buy the 
goods at the lowest price possible or consideration of employment issues. The tension 
between the “free market”, absent from state intervention in the production and distribution of 
goods and services, and the use of anticompetitive practices by firms to achieve the 
maximisation of profits, need to be solved by some sort of competition policy.39  The 
competition policy can have its focus on only economic considerations or embedded in other 
policy objectives. The former is illustrated by the role of competition policy in the US, which 
concentrates on the implementation of economic theory only, while the EC is an example of 
the later. In the EC, considerations of economic values are not the sole objective of the 
                                                          
36 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p. 95f. 
37 J. Faull/A. Nikpay, as note 17 above, p. 4 
38 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p. 14 
39 D. Hildebrand, as  note 16 above, p. 9 
Towards International Competition Rules?                                                                       Charlotte Brorsson   
 22
competition law but consumer welfare and different types of social goals will also guide the 
application of the competition provisions.40 
 
However, even nations that are strongly in favour of promoting economic efficiency and are 
very devoted to the free market theory of Adam Smith, will not refrain from intervening in the 
market. It is common for industries everywhere to receive subsidies, and for governments to 
take into account employment consideration and to promote small and medium sized 
enterprises. The competition laws of nations will thus vary, depending on what governments 
regard as valuable objectives for the competition policy to promote and protect.41 
 
       2.4.1 The Harvard School 
One of the models with the greatest influence on the US competition policy, has been the so-
called S-C-P paradigm of the Harvard School.42 The paradigm indicates that the structure of 
the market decides the firm’s behaviour and that behaviour determines market performance, 
e.g. profitability, efficiency, technical progress, and growth. In practice, the theory suggests 
that concentrated industry structures will cause a behaviour that result in poor economic 
performance, especially limited output and monopoly prices.43 The model was developed by 
E.S. Mason in the 1930s and was further developed by his pupil J.S. Bain in the 1950s.44  
 
Bains argued that most industries were more concentrated than necessary (the economies of 
scale were not very high in most industries), that there existed many and difficult barriers to 
entry, which deterred new firms from establishing themselves on the market, and that 
monopoly pricing connected with oligopolies started to occur at relatively low levels of 
concentration.45  
 
The theory of the Harvard school suited the American political interest and fitted in the 
ideological climate of the 1960s. This was a time when government interventions were 
favoured to nullify the effects of monopolies and oligopolies and the US Congress attempted 
to pursue a more restrictive competition policy with the goal of protecting small businesses. 
The School aimed to develop intervention criteria for when it was appropriate for 
                                                          
40 Ibid, p 11  
41 Ibid p. 17  
42 It got its name because many of its originators worked in Harvard. 
43 A. Jones, B. Sufrin, as note 33 above, p. 20 
44 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p. 134 
45 A. Jones, B. Sufrin, as note 33 above, p. 20 
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governments to legalise against a conduct. The result was a rigid scrutiny of all types of 
behaviour and a lot of prohibitions, for example in relation to vertical agreements and 
conglomerate mergers.46 
 
       2.4.2 The Chicago School 
The Harvard school was criticised by several economists, for example by Stigler, Demsetz, 
and Bork, which belonged to the so-called Chicago school. The adherents to this thought of 
school argued that the relationship between entry barriers, concentration and profits was not 
as evident as the Harvard School claimed. The Chicago school created a revolution in antitrust 
thinking and has had a major influence on the US antitrust policy during the 1970s and the 
1980s. The Chicago school denied the link between profitability and a high degree of 
concentrations and argued that a high level of concentration and profitability could be caused 
by efficiency gains achieved by companies who knew how to run an effective business policy.  
 
The Chicago school emphasises that competition law should only be concerned with the 
production of allocative efficiency. It puts a strong trust on the market, which should direct 
the success or failure of a firm. Stigler called this market process, which is directed by the 
survival of the fittest, Economic Darwinism. If inefficient firms are forced out of the market 
the industry will become more concentrated. However, this is desirable from a competition 
policy point of view as it creates more efficient businesses.47 The belief in the market, 
depends on the assumption that there exist few entry barriers, that industries often achieve 
economies of scale and that businesses are profit-maximisers. These features therefore make it 
easy for the members of the Chicago school to conclude that the market is able to correct and 
create efficiency without any significant interference from governments or competition 
laws.48  
 
One of the followers of the Chicago school, R. H. Bork, argues that antitrust laws only have a 
single goal, which is the maximisation of consumer welfare. It is therefore the responsibility 
of the courts to regard consumer welfare as the sole value when assessing antitrust cases.49 
Competition should thus be understood as the maximisation of consumer welfare, or in other 
words economic efficiency. To achieve this objective, courts must apply an economic 
                                                          
46 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p. 134 
47 J. Faull/A. Nikpay, as note 17 above, pp. 4-5 
48 A. Jones, B. Sufrin, as note 33 above, p. 21 
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reasoning where possible losses of efficiency and the allocation of resources are weighed 
against the possible benefits in the productive use of those resources. “In a word, the goal is 
maximum economic efficiency to make us as wealthy as possible. The distribution of that 
wealth of the accomplishment of noneconomic goals are the proper subjects of other laws and 
not within the competence of judges deciding antitrust cases.”50  
 
As already mentioned, the Chicago school has influenced the competition policy of the US 
and changed the rigorous approach of the Harvard school to a rather loose policy, based on 
the application of purely economic considerations. Even if the Supreme Court never explicitly 
stated that efficiency should be the sole value to take into account when assessing antitrust 
cases, it has expressed, on several occasions, that efficiency is very important.51  
 
       2.4.3 Criticisms to the Chicago school  
Despite the impact the Chicago school has had on the US antitrust policy, it has not avoided 
criticisms. Their model has been criticised as being to static and of having its focus too much 
on long-term benefits of competition policy rather than short-term effects. Moreover, the neo-
classical market efficiency model of the Chicago school is too simple to predict or fit business 
conduct in the real world.52  The Chicago school claims that its findings are non-political 
since they are only concerned with the market. However, Fox and Sullivan argue that such a 
standpoint in itself expresses a political view. They feel that the law cannot and should not 
only be about economics but that economics can provide an instrument to support the antitrust 
system to serve the interest of the consumer.53      
 
       2.4.4 The debate today 
The discussion today refers less to doctrines and the S-C-P paradigm has during the recent 
years been rewarded new attention. Even if it is admitted that market structure has 
implications for a firm’s conduct, it is now recognised that there are several basic conditions, 
like consumer preferences and state of technology, which will influence market structure. 
Moreover, it is acknowledged that conduct is not an insignificant player when it comes to 
explaining performance. There is also a wide acceptance that both performance and conduct 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
49 R. H. Bork, (1993) The Antitrust Paradox – A Policy at War with Itself, With a New Introduction and 
Epilouge, 2nd edition, p. 51 
50 Ibid, p. 427 
51 D. Hildebrand, as note 16 above, p. 149 
52 A. Jones, B. Sufrin, as note 33 above, p. 26 
53 E. Fox and L. A. Sullivan, in A. Jones, B. Sufrin, as note 33 above, p. 25 
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can influence market structure so the S-C-P paradigm is no longer “a one way” scheme. 
Accordingly, the S-C-P paradigm still plays a role in the industrial economics and in 
competition policy, not as a perfect model but as a guideline.  
      
       2.4.5 The industrial economics 
The strategic behaviour of companies in oligopolistic markets has been the focus of the latest 
development of industrial economics. The industrial economics have tried, through the use of 
well-developed microeconomic models and with assistance of game theory, to find out the 
possible company strategies and whether collusion is likely or not. This is suitable for the 
more moderate, less ideological, and more technical approach of the nineties. So far, this new 
approach has not resulted in a robust and detailed guideline useful for competition policy. 
Faull and Nikpay argue that the focus on only one factor will not be enough to identify anti-
competitive behaviour. It would therefore be favourable and more effective if nations’ 
competition authorities evaluated a mixture of aspects, both structural, behavioural, and 
performance considerations.54  
     
       2.4.6 The EC Competition Policy 
Competition policy plays a significant role in the EC and is a valuable tool to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaty. Article 2 of the Treaty lays down the general objectives of the 
Community, which should be established by a common market and an economic and 
monetary union;  
“ to promote throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of 
economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between 
men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness 
and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of 
the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and 
economic and social cohesion and solidarity amongst Member States.”55 
 
Besides these objectives, the principle of an open market economy with free competition will 
also guide the competition policy of the Community. However, this principle, which is 
embedded in the Treaty, “does not imply an attitude of unconditional faith with respect to the 
operation of market mechanisms. On the contrary, it requires a serious commitment as well as 
self-restraint by public powers, aimed at preserving those mechanisms”.56  Another, very 
important factor, for the development of the competition policy of the Community, is the 
                                                          
54 J. Faull/A. Nikpay, as note 17 above, pp. 7-8 
55 Article 2 of the Treaty 
56 M. Monti, European Competition Policy for the 21st Century, The Fordham Corporate  Law Institute –Twenty-
eight Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York 20 October 2000, available at 
www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/ 
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single market integration. The achievement of the single market has, by the Commission and 
by the ECJ, often played a part in the decisions. However, competition policy is not regarded 
as the only efficient tool to achieve the goals of the EC. The application of EC competition 
policy must therefore be made with considerations to other activities of the Commission, e.g. 
in relation to industrial, regional, social, and environmental policies.57 The competition policy 
of the EC has often been concerned with the promotion of small and medium sized 
enterprises, the competitiveness of businesses, the opening up of markets, and the 
enhancement of the consumer welfare.  
 
The above enumeration of the objectives the Commission take into consideration when 
pursuing its competition policy does not mean that efficiency has no place in the application 
of EC competition law. There are some ambiguities concerning the exact scope for the 
Commission when applying efficiencies and a more detailed analysis of this issue will be 
accounted for later. It is here enough to state that EC competition policy has as one of its 
many objectives, the production of efficiency. Consequently, the EC competition policy 
acknowledges efficiency and the allocation of resources as valuable aims, but they are 
interacted with other Community polices, as described above. Efficiency is not regarded as 
the sole objective of the law, and the EC is therefore not a firm follower of the Chicago 
schools’ view.58  
 
2.5 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell        2.5.1 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas        
In December 1996 the Boeing Company (Boeing) announced its intention to acquire 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC). The two companies were manufacturing aircraft; 
Boeing had the leading position in the world and McDonnell Douglas enjoyed the third place. 
The post-merger would only face significant competition by the European based Airbus. 
Boeing argued that the merger would enhance efficiency and promote consolidation in the US 
defence industry. The transaction would also save 14 000 jobs at the struggling McDonnell 
Douglas. The FTC acknowledged that the merger, on its face, raised serious antitrust 
questions. Boeing had 60 percent of the market for large commercial aircraft, which was a 
highly concentrated market with significant entry barriers. The company had also concluded 
exclusive twenty-year sole-supplier contracts with three major airlines; Delta, Continental and 
American airlines. The FTC considered these contracts as something that might cause 
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concerns in the future, and would continue to observe the situation carefully.59 However, in 
the overall assessment the FTC concluded that Douglas Aircraft (McDonnell Douglas’s 
commercial aircraft part) would neither re-establish itself in the commercial aircraft market, 
nor did any potential buyer exist to invest in the company. Thus, the acquisition of McDonnell 
Douglas by Boeing would not, in American antitrust terms, substantially lessen competition in 
the relevant market and the FTC cleared the merger in its total.60  
 
Boeing’s exclusive supply agreements with American, Continental and Delta airlines were 
according to the Commission an indication that Boeing enjoyed a dominant position in the 
relevant market. The exclusive contracts accounted for approximately 13 % of the 12 000 
estimated aircraft that would be sold on the open market from 1997-2016 and the Commission 
thus regarded the agreements to give rise to serious foreclosure effects over the next 20 years. 
The Commission evaluated that the merger would give the companies a strengthened position 
of dominance in the market for large aircraft. The relevant market was also characterised by 
significant entry barriers due to, for example, huge investment costs and strict safety 
regulation by nations.61 Other concerns of the Commission were possible spillovers from the 
McDonnell Douglas’s defence division. The Commission cleared the merger first after 
Boeing agreed to several concessions and after extensive lobbying from the US authorities.62  
       
       2.5.2 Ge/Honeywell 
The merger between GE and Honeywell was announced in October 2001 and was notified in 
the US on November the same year and in the EC on February 2002. Both GE and Honeywell 
manufactured engines but Honeywell also made avionics and non-avionics products. The 
merger would result in horizontal overlaps and vertical and conglomerate integration of the 
merging parties’ activities. For example, GE’s leasingarm, GECAS, was the largest purchaser 
of aircraft in the world and thereby a customer downstream of the supply of avionics and 
engines. GE capital provided GE with financial stability and enabled GE to invest large 
amounts into research and development. While the US cleared the merger without any 
demand for concessions, the EC found the merger problematic. The Commission did not 
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regard the concessions offered by GE as sufficient and after Honeywell had asked GE to raise 
its concession once more, which GE refused to do, the Commission prohibited the deal.  
 
The Commission feared the merger would strengthen GE’s dominant position in the markets 
for large commercial aircraft engines and large regional jet aircraft engines and create a 
dominant position on the market for corporate jet engines.63 A contributing factor to GE’s 
dominance was GE’s vertical integration into aircraft purchasing, financing and leasing 
activities through GECAS. GECAS was the largest purchaser of aircraft in the world and the 
Commission argued that GECAS could influence aircraft manufactures and their choice of 
engines. GECAS GE-only policy was feared to extend to Honeywell products as well, with 
the effect of foreclosing the market.64 GE also had unique strong financial position due to its 
financial organisation, GE Capital, which managed over 80 % of GE’s total assets. It was 
argued that this allowed GE to take more risks in its product development programmes than 
any of its competitors.65 Moreover, the Commission extensively discussed the issue of mixed 
bundling and it feared that the post-merger’s broad product range would allow it to engage in 
bundling with the effect of foreclosing competitors that did not have complementary products 
to offer.66 Mixed bundling occurs when products are available on a stand-alone basis, but are 
offered also as a package on cheaper terms. The mixed bundling was argued to be possible 
because of the complementary product range GE and Honeywell produced and from the cost-
advantages the package would generate.67 The issue of mixed bundling in GE/Honeywell and 
the issue on exclusive supply contracts in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas clearly show the US 
and the EC’s different positions regarding efficiencies. It is evident that it will be hard to 
reach convergence in antitrust cases when there are substantial differences in the competition 
analysis between the two jurisdictions.  
 
       2.5.3 Efficiency consideration in the US and the EC 
As already has been explained, both sides of the Atlantic take into consideration a range of 
goals, inclusive allocative efficiency, but the US performs a more comprehensive economic 
analysis. Economic efficiency consist of maximisation of social welfare by enhancing 
allocative efficiency (that is producing what the consumers desire as shown by their 
willingness to pay) and productive efficiency (producing goods and services by the use of as 
                                                          
63 Commission Decision, General Electric/Honeywell, 3 July 2001, Case No Comp/M. 2220, para 341 
64 Ibid, paras 126-127, 406  
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few resources as possible) and by promoting progressiveness (by for example rewarding 
innovation and development). Difficulties arise when mergers on the one hand restrain 
competition and on the other hand increase efficiency by, for example, a decrease in unit cost 
of production.68 However, social welfare is more than just giving what the consumers want at 
as low price as possible. Social goals, like reducing unemployment or protecting the 
environment are not as well measured in terms of economic efficiency. It is difficult to see 
how only the production of what the consumers want to purchase to the lowest price possible, 
will enhance social welfare in its total. It is argued that a better way to describe economic 
efficiency would be to state that it consists of maximisation of fair pricing and adequate 
output to the benefits of the consumers. Social welfare is generally viewed as encompassing 
other concerns then just economic efficiency.  
 
In the US efficiency claims do not constitute a defence to an anticompetitive merger but is 
something that will be taken into account when assessing the net competitive effects of the 
merger. The Merger Guidelines section 4 states the principles for the analysis of efficiency by 
the FTC. It is for example possible to rebut a presumption of illegality by showing unique 
economic circumstances that undermine the findings of the competition authorities. The 
Guidelines also state that: 
 
“The primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate… 
efficiencies. Efficiencies generated through merger can enhance the merged firm’s ability 
and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced 
service, or new products… Even when efficiencies generated through merger enhance a 
firm’s ability to compete, however, a merger may have other effects that may lessen 
competition and ultimately may make the merger anticompetitive… To make the requisite 
determination, the Agency considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be 
sufficient to reverse the merger’s potential to harm consumers in the relevant market.”69  
 
Commissioner Monti has, in a speech in 2000, explained the scope for efficiency to be taken 
into consideration when applying the EC Merger Regulation;  
 
 “…once the existence of dominance has been established or foreseen as likely to be 
created, the test leaves less scope for the Commission to take account of arguments relating 
to the efficiencies which the merger might bring about, than does the US merger control 
test (“a substantial lessening of competition”)”.70 
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This statement of the Commissioner is the most informative explanation of the current scope 
of efficiency considerations in the Merger Regulation. Despite the absence of an explicitly 
stated recognition of efficiencies in the Merger Regulation, the criterion of technical and 
economic progress as included in Article 2 (1) of the Merger Regulation has been said to open 
up for a kind of efficiency defence. Also “ the structure of the market concerned” in 2 (1) of 
the Merger Regulation might refer to an alike approach. However, such a possibility exists 
only if it is to the consumers’ advantage and does not hinder competition, thus economical 
consideration of efficiencies in these contexts is almost always excluded.71  
 
The recent case law indicates a gradual development towards a greater acceptance of 
efficiencies by the Commission. In the case of the de Havilland72, it was argued by the 
defendant that one of the aims with the merger was to reduce costs. The Commission founded 
that those cost-savings would only have a “negligible impact” for the parties but did not 
dismiss the efficiency consideration in its overall evaluation of the merger. The conclusion 
drawn from the decision has been that the efficiency gains need to be “substantial and merger 
specific, with the burden of proof resting on the parties.”73 The EC thus deals with efficiencies 
between the lines, even if it in practice is used as a defence to illegality. The unwillingness by 
the Commission and the ECJ to explicitly recognise efficiency considerations creates 
confusion and opens up for accusation of industrial policy consideration.74  
 
The development towards a further acceptance of efficiencies by the Commission now seem 
to have culminated with the modernisation process of EC competition laws and the embedded 
reform of the Merger Regulation. Commissioner Monti has therefore had many occasions to 
talk about the scope of efficiency claims in merger cases. In a speech on November 2002, he 
clarified the Commission’s position regarding efficiencies; 
 
“…an explicit recognition of merger-specific efficiencies is possible without changing the 
present wording of the substantive test in the Merger Regulation. Article 2(1)(b) of the 
Merger Regulation provides a clear legal basis in that respect by stating that the 
Commission shall take account, inter alias, of “the development of technical and economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the District of Columbia Bar Association’s Antitrust Committee of the International Law Section, Washington, 
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71 P. D. Camesasca, as note 68 above, p. 24 
72 Commission Decision, Case IV/M.053, Aerospatiale- Alenia/de Halivand v. Commission,  
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progress provided it is to consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to 
competition. 
 
The guidelines should say that the Commission intends to carefully consider any efficiency 
claim in the overall assessment of the merger, and may ultimately decide that, as a 
consequence of the efficiencies the merger brings about, the merger does not create or 
strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded. 75  
 
It is thus clear that the Commission intends to take efficiency considerations into account. 
However, Monti underlines that the efficiency gains must have a certain weight and need to 
“be of direct benefit to consumers, as well as being merger-specific, substantial, timely, and 
verifiable”.76 It is unlikely that an efficiency claim would be regarded as sufficient in a 
transaction leading to monopoly or quasi-monopoly.77 
        
       2.5.4 The efficiency considerations in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
In the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, the FTC considered that the merger would result in 
significant industry efficiency and that competition would remain almost untouched. For 
aircraft manufacturers, a close cooperation between the producer and the customers was 
regarded as important due to the necessity to secure financial commitment and because design 
and functions depend on the customer’s desire.78 The exclusive supply contracts were thus 
seen as efficiency enhancing for this industry.  
 
The Commission saw Boeing’s exclusive supply contracts with American, Continental and 
Delta airlines, as giving rise to serious foreclosure effects.79 It also suggested that these effects 
would give the incentives for other large airlines to conclude such exclusive contracts.80 The 
likelihood for the exclusive agreement to result in foreclosure effects has been questioned and 
it has been suggested that what the Commission really feared was that the cost-advantages 
incurred by the agreements could be used by Boeing to unfairly exploit its competitors. It is 
possible however, that the Commission favours the preservation of interfirm rivalry in order 
to establish competition instead of a process to produce efficiencies.81 
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The American position towards exclusive supply contracts has in the history differed a lot. In 
the late 1970s the Supreme Court was increasingly influenced by the Chicago school antitrust 
analysis, and recognised widely the efficiency gains generated by exclusive supply contracts 
and that such contracts should not be prohibited per se. Exclusive supply agreements should 
instead be assessed under the rule of reason and were thereby only permitted if their positive 
effects outweighed the negative aspects of the agreement. The American policy in the 1990s 
have, however, renewed the concern over exclusive supply contracts. The antitrust authorities 
have challenged several vertical mergers and other vertical agreements, including exclusive 
supply contracts. However, efficiency of vertical agreements are still recognised but there is 
an awareness that such restraints may, by their aggregate effects, reduce the overall supply of 
goods in a market, instead of increasing it.82  
 
The EC will also take into account the efficiency of exclusive supply contracts and will 
balance these against possible negative aspects. In the new Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 
adopted on 24 May 2000, the Commission explained the new economic approach under the 
Block Exemption Regulation.83 The Commission thereby approaches the American view 
regarding economic analysis, by increasingly emphasising its importance when assessing 
vertical restraints. It also indicates a more lenient approach for evaluating vertical agreements 
than the Commission used to apply.84  However, as seen by the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
merger the Commission was not prepared to give efficiency gains the same weight as the 
FTC.  
 
       2.5.5 The efficiency consideration in GE/Honeywell 
In GE/Honeywell, the main concern of the Commission was the mixed bundling the post-
merger could offer to its customers. Because aircraft equipment and engines are 
complementary, the Commission feared that the GE would be able to sell more avionics if it 
priced the engine more cheaply, and vice versa. Prices would fall and this might in the long-
term force competitors with a narrower product range out of the market. The high entry 
barriers for the relevant market would also make new entrances difficult. The Commission 
thus emphasised the long-term structural effects instead of any short-term benefits of the 
merger. It has been argued that the Commission’s interest of the long-term procompetitive 
effects risk prohibiting mergers that in the short-term would create efficiency gains, if there is 
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any, even remote possibility that the merger will force competitors out of the market. It is also 
difficult to predict the long-term benefits considering the long time frame and economic 
assumption of for example the development of future products.85 Moreover, the 
Commission’s lack of confidence towards the ability of market entry and its many interests, 
e.g. of helping small and medium sized enterprises, might have played a role in the decision. 
It has been argued that the US, on the other hand, considers the present benefits of the merger 
instead of more speculative long-term conduct of the parties, and encourages competitors to 
provide better competitive responses.86  
 
The cases clearly illustrate that nations with qualified competition laws, and even when one 
nation’s law is influenced by the other, can have substantial differences in their analysis of 
competition in a given case. The EC has been accused of not taking enough consideration to 
economic arguments and to efficiency gains, and to protect competitors and not competition. 
It has been argued that the European focus on competitors and on the consumers might 
broaden the jurisdiction limits, since the breadth of the interest to be assessed is wider and 
thus results in a narrower scope for restraints.87   
        
        2.5.6 The jurisdictional aspect 
It is clear that the mergers had an economic impact in the European and the American market 
and were able to alter the competitive structure of the market on a worldwide basis. The 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas concerned two US based firms and it was in the US the 
agreement would have substantially and wide-ranging economic effects, as well as tangible 
impact on the employment policy and in the field of defence. In the EC, it was mainly the 
position of Airbus that was threatened and this was of great concern to the Commission. The 
Commission also feared that the interests of the consumers would be affected. Since the 
effects in the EC, were not as clear as on the American market it was not evident that the EC 
should have taken jurisdiction in the first place. However, when doing so, it took a similar 
approach as the US towards extraterritoriality, even if it did not apply a pure effect-doctrine.88 
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        2.5.7 The effect doctrine 
The effect doctrine was developed under American law in 1945 by the Alcoa case89, where 
judge Learned Hand stated that the Sherman Act applied to behaviour anywhere in the world 
that affected American business and commerce. This position has caused significant conflicts 
with other nations, especially after the US courts began to assess conduct within the 
jurisdiction of other countries. In order to reduce the ambiguities in the Alcoa formulation, the 
Congress enacted the Federal Trade Antitrust Improvement Act in 1982. The Act requires the 
conduct outside the US to have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on 
US domestic commerce or on US exports.90 
       
     2.5.8 The single economic entity theory 
In the same way the EC Merger Regulation lacks explicit rules for efficiency considerations, 
it is silent regarding its international scope and whether the Commission has extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction. Article 1 of the Merger Regulation provides the threshold for a 
transaction to have a Community dimension and thus needs to be notified to the Commission. 
It thereby activates the Commission’s jurisdiction to transactions, despite the fact that the 
parties are non-EC undertakings.91 This is a very broad definition and even if the Community 
rules on international jurisdiction apply to the Merger Regulation as well, they do not limit the 
extraterritorial reach in any significant way.  
 
The EC has traditionally applied the single economic entity theory to non-European 
enterprises, as provided by the Dyestuff-case.92 The ECJ there held the parent companies 
responsible for the anticompetitive behaviour of their subsidiaries, despite the fact that only 
the subsidiaries were located within the EC. This was especially the case when the parent 
companies used their power to control the subsidiaries and the subsidiaries had little 
possibility to act independently. In the landmark case Wood Pulp93, which concerned the 
application of article 81 and 82, the ECJ appeared to give support for the effect doctrine. The 
case concerned anticompetitive behaviour by non-EC producers to the detriment for EC 
consumers and was regarded to fall under the jurisdiction of the EC. However, the ECJ did 
not explicitly refer to the effect doctrine and it made a distinction between implementation 
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and formation of an agreement. Once the agreement was implemented in the EC the Merger 
Regulation applied to the conduct. The absence of an explicit recognition of the effect 
doctrine has blurred the validity of the doctrine. However, it has been argued that the 
application of the pure effect doctrine will probably only be needed in relatively few cases 
and it, in most cases will be enough to apply the economic entity theory or the reasoning in 
the Wood Pulp.94 In the Grencor-case95, in which the Merger Regulation was applied, the 
distinction between implementation and formation was widely interpreted and it was enough 
to establish a mere sale within the Community for the Commission to assert jurisdiction. 
Consequently, if the undertakings have a Community dimension, their agreement is likely to 
be considered as implemented within the EC and will often be deemed to have a direct, 
substantial and foreseeable effect within the Community. The wide definition of Community 
dimension decided by the turnover criteria will in practice be the principal tool for the 
Commission to assert jurisdiction over non-EC undertakings.96  
 
The two largest economies of the world will thus apply some form of the economic effect test 
and this position is reaching further acceptance. However, if extending nations’ jurisdiction to 
outside its territory, as the economic effect doctrine does, the risk for conflicts between 
countries increases.97 It has been argued that the Community dimension is far too broad to be 
the only criterion to decide jurisdiction, and more considerations should be taken to actual and 
potential effects inside the Community. Such actual and potential effects will depend on more 
than just the turnover of the undertakings. If the wide applications of the Merger Regulation 
would be limited, the workload and costs for the Commission would be reduced.98 However, 
without any multinational regulation of cross-border mergers, nations will not accept to limit 
their jurisdiction; the different political and economic interests would deter any authority to 
accept, one-sided, a reduction of its jurisdiction.99  
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      2.5.9 Analysis 
Anticompetitive mergers are only one form of anticompetitive behaviour that nations’ 
competition laws try to regulate. However, in merger cases there are particular problems to 
define an anticompetitive transaction. In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell, the 
Commission was accused for having taken industrial policy reason into consideration and not 
applying an enough thorough economic analysis. These kinds of accusations imply that 
consideration to e.g. small and medium sized enterprises, to the environment or to 
employment issues should be protectionistic. To take it to its extreme, any form of merger that 
is cleared after an assessment that is not purely based on economic factors would be regarded 
as an anticompetitive merger. But is it so obvious and simple to say that competition 
authorities that value other elements than just efficiency gains should be deemed as acting 
with protectionism?  
 
It could be argued that mergers, which are beneficial to the consumers, always should be 
approved. But it may be, and probably very often are, situations where the merger in order to 
reduce costs for the consumers will have to rationalise. It is often out of the rationalisation 
benefits a merger is proposed in the first place. Consequently, at the same time as the merger 
would be beneficial to the consumers it would have negative implications for the employees, 
whom may loose their jobs. Should the interest of the consumers outweigh for example, the 
interest of preserving jobs or other social dimensions? All depends on what one believes is the 
purpose of competition and how one defines anticompetitive behaviour.  
 
There is no objective definition of the term anticompetitive behaviour but it depends on 
government’s policy, judicial decisions and values. The American concept, that competition 
law is an instrument to produce efficiency through markets, has been argued to not necessarily 
provide the right answer. Professor Fox argues that antitrust is  
 
“whatever legislators and judges of particular jurisdictions say it is. It ranges from a body 
of law that controls business practices in order to protect or empower the underdog, to 
laws that check and disperse business power and assure a better distribution of opportunity 
and wealth to the nonestablished. Antitrust includes law that preserves the competitive 
process and its governance of markets and law that advances efficiency through markets 
anchored (for example) by an aggregate wealth or a consumer welfare paradigm.” 100 
 
The objective of competition law within a national system may also evolve and transform 
over time depending on the level of industrialisation of the economy, the strength of the 
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political democracy, the intensity of the judiciary and the exposure of domestic enterprises to 
global competition. However, nations often have the same policy regarding certain types of 
conduct, which usually are prohibited because of fairness and efficiency reasons. This is most 
evident in relation to competitors’ price fixing, market division, and cartels and against naked 
monopolistic exclusions designed to prevent market entry or expansion. However, there are 
exemptions to this coordinated approach. Developing countries may want to allow cartels in 
strategic goods in which they have an advantage, especially raw materials and as the 
Microsoft case illustrates, it is possible that the opinion about what is naked monopolistic 
exclusion varies.101  
    
         2.6 Conclusion 
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas illustrates how sensitive the application of merger control 
rules is to political interference. There is a significant political value to premerger approval 
decisions and this together with the difficulties of objectively and precisely define structural 
restraints to competition enhance the likelihood for political pressures on competition 
authorities and tensions between jurisdictions. It often seems that the application of merger 
control rules is influenced by industrial policy reasons or by political objectives. A common 
multiple merger control system would reduce the political conflicts between the politicians in 
different countries and reduce accusations of camouflaged protectionism.102 For the business 
community, a multiple merger regime would also provide enhanced legal certainty and 
hopefully a simplified notification procedure.  
 
The need for international competition rules/policy has been widely recognised after these 
cases, and as more nations enact competition laws it is not hard to picture mergers that have to 
be evaluated in more than two jurisdictions. Since the probability that the outcomes of these 
evaluations always will be the same is not very high, legal uncertainty, difficulties of 
enforcement and potential political conflicts will increase. However, further convergence can 
only be established by further cooperation between nations’ competition authorities and such 
cooperation is not realistic if nations do not receive greater understanding for other trading 
countries’ competition systems.  
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Part 2 
 
3. The relationship between trade and competition policy    
3.1 Introduction 
There has been an extensive debate concerning the relationship between trade and 
competition policies both bilateral and multilateral. The most recent discussion has occurred 
within the Working Group on Trade and International Competition Policy, which was 
established by the parties to the WTO in 1997. It is legitimate to question why this 
relationship is of any relevance in the discussion of international competition laws. However, 
it was from the observation that anticompetitive conduct might have negative consequences 
on the trade between nations that the Working Group was developed and the discussion 
started.  
 
As stated in the introduction, there is a fear that the benefits of the trade liberalisation will be 
consumed by an increase of private and governmental anticompetitive behaviour if there is no 
harmonisation of nations’ competition laws. Governments and businesses will have a greater 
incentive to impede the competitive environment in order to shift a way profits from 
foreigners and to compensate from the economic losses the reduction of trade barriers will 
result in. From a global perspective, impediments to trade reduce world welfare and diminish 
international trade. It is therefore important that governments and businesses refrain from 
anticompetitive actions that distort the trade liberalisation.  
 
       3.1.1 Competition and trade contradict and complement each other 
Harmonised competition rules might contribute to further trade liberalisation and reduce the 
pressures from private businesses on governments to obtain special treatment.103  This is so 
because harmonised competition laws remove restraints to the commercial flows and enhance 
trade while international trade and the reduction of tariffs encourage competition. Trade 
policies and competition policies thus seem to depend on each other.104 However, it has also 
been argued that the two policies contradict each other, as well as substitute each other. They 
contradict each other since they typically aim at competing interests. While trade policy 
mostly is directed at restricting trade in order to let producers exercise market power and to 
shift profits away from foreigners, competition policy is concerned with the protection of 
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consumer interests and to restrict the exercise of firms’ market power.105 Another difference 
between the two policies is that competition policy is set at national level while trade policy is 
set at the industry level. Trade policy might thus give exemptions to certain industries where 
competition policy is not written separately for each industry.106  
 
       3.1.2 The import-as-market-discipline 
It has been argued that the two policies can substitute each other as well, meaning that 
increased trade will result in enhanced international competition and constrain the ability of 
domestic producers to engage in anticompetitive practices. A reduction of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to trade will thus tighten the national competitiveness making competition law 
superfluous. This is known as the import-as-market-discipline.107 The issue has been brought 
up by nations, characterised by having small and open economies and thus intense imports. 
They argue that the trade liberalisation itself promote imports and achieve a competitive 
environment, without any need for competition legislation. Thus trade liberalisation forces 
competition and market openness and therefore works as a substitute to domestic national 
competition law.108 There are, however, factors that may alter the import-as-market-
discipline. Firstly, many services are not traded and competition law might still be needed to 
deal with high concentration in a service market. Secondly, in a differentiated product 
industry, domestic firms will be able to exercise market power if the cross-price elasticity of 
demand for home varieties compare to the price of foreign varieties is not very elastic.109 
Efficient industries might be able to better maintain profitability when challenged by foreign 
competition and industries may also use passed profits to innovate and compete in other ways 
than just price.  
 
4. Possible or existing ways to achieve further convergence in international antitrust 
matters 
4.1 Historical background – The ITO Charter 
The awareness of the transnational dimension of market conduct is not a recent phenomenon. 
Trading nations have been discussing possible international actions against restrictive 
business- and governmental practices since the mid- to late 1940’s, when the nations 
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completed and nearly adopted the ITO Charter (1948), out of which GATT 1947 came into 
being.110 The intention was initially that the International Trade Organisation (ITO) should be 
a UN organ with world membership and staffed by a secretariat. The ITO Charter was also 
expected to have power to hear complaints, issue rulings and make recommendations, and its 
provisions should be subject to review of the International Court of Justice. These 
expectations were in line with the drafters’ wish to create a more efficient and powerful 
organisation than the previous interwar trade agreements. The ITO Charter was therefore 
provided with forceful, substantive provisions, which were formulated with the greatest 
possible specificity. However, with the detailed provisions, little scope was left for any broad 
evasions and governments soon started to feel that their sovereignty was threatened. They 
started to demand for exemptions that would make the provisions less intrusive. This resulted 
in a patchwork of exemptions, which undermined the Charter’s legal system.111 
 
The ITO Charter was, despite or probably because of its many exemptions, completed in 
Havana in 1948. Chapter V of the Charter contained some competition provisions, for 
example, relating to price fixing.112 The intention was that the governments of the members to 
the ITO should ratify the Charter. However, the US Congress failed to adopt it and 
consequently the ITO Charter never came into force.113  
 
       4.1.1 The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
After the failure of the ITO, it did not take long before the GATT served the purpose as the 
world’s international trade organisation. However, the GATT was never intended as an 
organisation but a multilateral treaty designed to be attached to the umbrella of the ITO. 
Because of the lack of organisation status there was no secretariat established for the GATT, 
but the small staff of the ITO served the needs of the GATT as well. When it became obvious 
that the ITO was never going to come into force, the staff of the ITO devoted its time to the 
GATT and became de facto the GATT secretariat.114  
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The drafters of the ITO Charter were, with few exceptions, the same men who negotiated the 
text of the GATT. It is therefore not surprising that the ambition of the ITO was reflected in 
the GATT and the drafted clauses of the GATT were almost the same as those in the draft 
ITO charter, which related to trading rules. The GATT also inherited the patchwork of 
exemptions of the ITO charter.115  
 
       4.1.2 The World Trade Organisation  
GATT has through eight negotiation rounds gradually reduced tariffs and other trade barriers, 
culminating in the Uruguay Round. However, it eventually became clear that the GATT had 
problems to adopting and dealing with the issues of today. The globalisation made the world 
more complex and interdependent and governments increasingly sought to benefit from the 
“loopholes” of the GATT. The GATT provisions did not have the efficiency and power to 
satisfactory deal with damaging national behaviour. In order to achieve a more efficient 
framework, which took account of the problems mentioned above and considerations, it was 
proposed to establish a new trade organisation.116 Such a new organisation was created as a 
result of the Uruguay Round and the GATT institutional function was replaced by the WTO 
on 1 January 1995.  
 
The Uruguay Round tried to correct the many defects of the GATT and it is therefore no 
longer possible for government officials to argue that the new institution and its provisions are 
non-binding. The new dispute settlement process unified the several existing dispute 
procedures under the prior GATT and its side agreements. Moreover, the Uruguay round 
produced a comparable treaty as the GATT for trade in services, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) and relating to intellectual property, notably the Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS).117  
 
There are some special features, which distinguish the WTO treaty from the GATT, even 
though the underlying principles are the same. For example the WTO has a wider range of 
liberalisation measures, such as trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual 
property rights and the abolition of voluntary export restraints. It has therefore been argued 
that the issue of competition policy is even more suitable and important under the WTO 
system than it was in the old GATT. It should be mentioned that there exist other international 
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organisations dealing with trade and competition. For example, trading partners have drafted 
voluntary codes and principles within the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).118 
 
       4.1.3 The Working Group 
When the WTO treaty was being negotiated a group of experts at the Max Planck Institute 
proposed a Draft International Antitrust Code that would establish an international 
competition regime. The Code was criticised as too ambitious and the parties to the WTO did 
not except the draft and no agreement was annexed to the WTO charter. However, promoted 
by the EC, the issue of international competition policies was brought up at the First 
Ministerial Conference of the parties to the WTO in Singapore in 1996 and a Working Group 
on Trade and International Competition Policy was established a year later. The Working 
Group has the objective of examining the interaction between trade and competition policy, 
including anticompetitive practices, in order to identify areas that may merit further 
considerations in the WTO framework.119 The Working Group initially examined the 
relationship between the objectives, principles, concepts, scope and instruments of trade and 
competition policy and their relationship with development and economic growth; stocktaking 
and analysis of existing instruments and standards and activities regarding trade and 
competition policy. Thereafter, the Working Group has examined three further areas: the 
relevance of the fundamental WTO principles of national treatment, transparency, and most-
favoured-nation treatment to competition policy and vice versa; approaches to promoting 
cooperation and communication among members, including in the field of technical 
cooperation, and the contribution of competition policy to achieving the objectives of the 
WTO, including the promotion of international trade.  
 
The Working Group has since its establishment presented yearly reports on its work. In 
accordance with the objective of the Group, which is to analyse the interaction between trade 
and competition on the basis of questions posed by the members, the reports have more the 
form of discussion where ideas are shared than any specific recommendation. It is evident 
when reading the reports that there is far from any consensus among nations that a multilateral 
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agreement on competition policy is needed. Even if such consensus could be achieved the 
next hurdles to overcome would concern the formulation of specific provisions, if the rules 
should be binding or only have the status of recommendations, if a dispute settlement process 
should be annexed to the agreement, and under which forum a multilateral agreement on 
international competition policy should be established. These issues have also been discussed 
by the Working Group. 
 
4.2 Bilateral/ regional agreements on competition  
One possible approach to achieve further convergence in competition policies is through the 
conclusion of bilateral agreements, an approach that the US is much in favour of. The US is 
already party to several bilateral agreements120 while the EC, on the other hand, has 
concluded bilateral agreements involving competition matters with the US and Canada and in 
2000, a mutual understanding with Japan on the substantial provisions of a similar 
cooperation agreement, was reached.121 Other ways to achieve cooperation in the area of 
competition are e.g. by friendship, commerce and navigation treaties, mutual legal assistance 
treaties and agreement on technical cooperation in competition law and policy. These 
examples are primarily of bilateral character.  
        
       4.2.1 Traditional and positive comity 
Bilateral agreements dealing with antitrust matters usually include provisions on traditional 
comity; i.e. an obligation to take into account the other party’s significant interest when 
investigating or applying remedies to corporate anticompetitive behaviour. Other common 
provisions concern assistance in investigation, when restrictive business practices in one 
nation adversely affect significant interest of the other party, commitments to give 
consideration to a request for investigatory assistance and in some agreements provisions to 
share confidential information (subject to safeguards).122 Some recent agreements also include 
a provision on positive comity. Such a provision provides for a harmed nation’s competition 
authority to request another party’s authority to initiate proceedings against anticompetitive 
practices originating within their territory and significantly affect important interest of the 
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first country. The requested authority should seriously consider such a request. However, it is 
still possible for the requesting nation to initiate or re-institute its own enforcement.  
 
       4.2.2 The 1991123 and 1998124 bilateral agreements 
The 1991 agreement between the US and the European Commission was the first bilateral 
instrument to include a provision on positive comity. This agreement was later replaced by the 
1998 agreement, which includes an “enhanced positive comity”.125 According to this 
provision the competition authority of an affected party will not take action if its citizens are 
not directly harmed or if the anticompetitive behaviour occur in the territory of the other party 
and is directed more towards that party.126   
 
There are some major flaws in the agreement. Firstly, the agreement does not apply to 
mergers because the short statutory deadlines in the two jurisdictions’ merger regulations 
make suspension or deferral of investigation almost impossible.127 The Commission’s lack of 
power to investigate mergers other than those having a Community dimension, has also been 
argued to be a reason for excluding mergers from the application of the agreement. 
Consequently, a request by the US authorities to investigate a transaction without a 
Community dimension would have to be dismissed by the Commission.128 It is thus difficult 
for the EC to cooperate in transnational merger cases. The second disadvantage with the 1998 
agreement is that the US courts are not bound by it. The US federal authorities are, but that 
hardly makes up for the weakness of not having proper enforcement tools in form of the 
courts. 
     
       4.2.3 Free trade, custom union and common market agreements  
Free trade, custom union or common market agreements differ from the other bilateral 
agreements mentioned above since they include some form of harmonisation objectives and 
not only procedural provisions regarding cooperation. There are many examples of regional 
system of competition rules. The EC, which has the most advanced cooperation in the field of 
                                                          
123 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European 
Communities regarding the application of their competition laws – Exchange of interpretative letters with the 
Government of the United States, Official Journal L 095, 27/04/1995 
124 Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America on the 
Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws,  
OJ L 173 of 18.06.1998 
125 Ibid, Article IV 
126 UNCTAD, as note 120 above, pp. 8-9 
127 J. L. McDavid, Globalization of Premerger Notification and Review: Practical Problems and Solutions, 
(1999) Ford. Corp. L. Inst. 31 at 35 (B. Hawk ed.) 
Towards International Competition Rules?                                                                       Charlotte Brorsson   
 45
competition, is one of them. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is also 
undertaking cooperation on competition issues but with a much less intense degree.129  
  
       4.2.4 The application of the 1991 agreement in Boeing/McDonnell Douglas 
In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas the 1991 US-EU Agreement was respected by the two 
nations130 and traditional comity was used to a certain extent. The US Government expressed 
concerns regarding its defence interests and it objected a divestiture of the companies. This 
objection was taken into consideration by the Commission, which limited its action to the 
civil side of the companies’ operations.131 However, it has been argued that the Commission 
did not enough respect the positive comity provision. This position is based on a proposal 
from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which suggests that a less concerned state should 
not exercise jurisdiction when that nation's interests are outweighed by the interest of the 
other state.132 The Commission should accordingly not have taken jurisdiction in the first 
place.  
 
The European legal system has been said to be unfamiliar to the practice of judicial discretion 
and this explains the Commission’s decision to assert jurisdiction in the case of 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas.133 It is however argued that, despite the above statement by the 
ICJ, some form of “pre-investigation” has to be done in order to evaluate what a nation’s 
interests are and their relation to the other party’s interests. Even if the principle of judicial 
discretion is valuable in order to reduce conflicts, it has to be more precisely defined. The 
general formulation of the ICJ is hard to interpret objectively and every nation can argue that 
their interests are of more importance than the interest of the other party. It would also be 
impossible to make up a grading system of all possible interests that can be weighed against 
each other. The interests will differ from case to case and its importance will also depend on 
the specific circumstances in each situation. However, compared with the reasoning of a 
world welfare standard where it was argued to be possible to draw up a scale of more or less 
permissible behaviour, 134 it might be that they also would regard it possible to more precisely 
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define the many valuable interests that exist in order for the formula of the ICJ to be more 
effective and for the judicial discretion to reach its fully potential.  
 
Despite the different opinion of the 1991 agreement’s proper application in 
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, the general view of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
FTC is that the agreement has worked well and enhanced the possibility to exchange ideas on 
enforcement policies and to cooperate in individual cases. The agreement provides for 
coordination of steps to be taken when the two jurisdictions investigate the same transaction. 
These steps may be a delimitation of the geographic market, timing of the procedures, 
remedies to be imposed and avoidance of conflicts between the nations. The FTC and DOJ 
admit, however, that the different timeframes for notifications in merger cases have limited 
the scope for cooperation but that the agreement in its total has improved the understanding of 
each other’s competition assessment. The American business community and the Congress 
are, however, not as thrilled by the outcome of the application of the agreement. The 
Congress is disappointed over the fact that the positive comity provision has not, in a 
significant way, increased the access to foreign markets so far. The business community 
complains over delays in investigations by the Commission and that the evidentiary standards 
are too high.135  
 
       4.2.5 The discussion of bilateral agreements in the Working Group 
The bilateral approach was discussed in the Working Group. Some members questioned the 
utility of a multilateral framework on competition policies and argued that a better way to deal 
with existing problems was through bilateral agreements. As already mentioned, the US is 
strongly in favour of the bilateral approach. They are supported by some developing 
countries, which fear that a system that force market openness will leave them vulnerable to 
exploitation by multinational enterprises or prevent them the right to have no competition law 
at all. They also claim that they need more time to learn before they can adhere to a 
multinational competition regime.136  
 
A multilateral agreement on competition policy was argued by the opponents, not to provide 
the necessary flexibility that nations needed in order to take into account their interests and 
their different legal traditions and state of development. The sovereignty of nations’ 
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competition authorities would also be reduced, especially if the provisions were subject to the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. The supporters of a multilateral framework 
responded to the criticism by arguing that the proposed binding commitments only should 
relate to legislation and would not interfere with the enforcement of nations’ legislation. A 
large degree of flexibility would thus be provided and the independence of nations’ 
competition authorities would be preserved.137 The scope was further limited in the report of 
2001 when it was suggested that binding commitments only should relate to substantive 
provisions in the area of hardcore cartels.138 This addition to the proposal is a good illustration 
of the unstructured nature the reports have. It is only after having read all the reports and 
compared them with each other that it is possible to understand the main ideas behind the 
arguments and the proposals. If only examining the reports separately from each other, there 
is a risk that one well-formulated argument by a member will, in a report one or two years 
later, be criticised or opposed using other relevant arguments, or supported by adding new 
thoughts or ideas to the proposal. It would have facilitated, if the Working Group had 
summarised the reports and sorted arguments and proposals into different categories 
depending on their relevance to different topics.   
 
It was argued in the Working Group that nations could use bilateral agreements to seek 
information and evidence from foreign firms and governments with the intention to enforcing 
their law extraterritorially. However, this type of abuse was admitted to be only a theoretical 
example and there was no evidence that such behaviour had actually taken place.139 Bilateral 
agreements in connection with regional and multilateral cooperation agreements could be 
another possible approach to achieve further convergence. Bilateral and regional agreements 
should thus serve as a starting point for a multilateral framework.140  
 
       4.2.6 The debate outside the Working Group 
Assistant Attorney General, Joel Klein, has argued that the objective legal and economic 
principles that are necessary for the foundation of an international agreement on competition 
law, are almost impossible to formulate in a way that all members can adhere to. Nations 
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would instead degrade their laws in order to reach consensus, and the agreement would thus 
be with a lowest common standard and with weak and inefficient competition rules. There 
would also be practical problems for the WTO to both identify and remedy infringements of a 
multilateral competition regime.141  
 
Despite the benefits mentioned above, there are some significant disadvantages with bilateral 
agreements on competition policy, which suggest that a multilateral framework is important to 
actively reduce the gap between the developed and developing world in competition / trade 
matters, and to reach a broader cooperation among the world’s nations in this field. Firstly, 
bilateral agreements are usually concluded between countries that are economically 
interdependent and that share a similar degree of experience in competition law enforcement. 
The fact that bilateral agreements are based on mutual interest and reciprocity excludes 
developing countries from entering into such agreements. There are also important trading 
partners that are not parties to any bilateral agreement.142 Secondly, it has been argued that, in 
the field of mergers, the necessary information that would make the review more accurate and 
efficient, sometimes lay in jurisdictions outside a nation’s set of bilateral agreements. 
Anticompetitive behaviour does not respect the neatly defined territory covered by those 
agreements and it might be that governments and business actively seek to use the gap 
between different bilateral agreements, to their advantage. It is feared that businesses would 
move to territories not covered by any enforcement cooperation agreement, territories that 
could be regarded as “safe havens”. However, as shown in the part concerning regulatory 
competition, it is unlikely that difference in nations’ enforcement procedures or in the 
substantive law of nations will have such a great influence on firms that they seek to conduct 
business in jurisdictions with lax enforcement policy. The reasons why many regard 
international competition policies as important are the awareness that anticompetitive 
practices impede trade by constituting new barriers and that many forms of anticompetitive 
conduct are transnational and cannot therefore be regulated within one nation.  
 
4.3 Multilateral agreement on international competition policies 
The Working Group was set up after a proposal by the EC to adopt a multilateral agreement 
on competition policy within the WTO. The need and usefulness of such an agreement has 
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consequently been discussed extensively within the Working Group but also by other 
organisations as well as by scholars. So far there is only one universally applicable 
multilateral devise relating to international competition policy and law, the Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practice (the Set), negotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD. The OECD provides several 
agreements on international competition policy as well but these apply only to a restricted 
group of nations, although non-OECD countries can implement the 1998 recommendation on 
hard-core cartels.143 Both the Set and the OECD recommendations include similar provisions 
as in the bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements and in free trade, customs union or 
common market agreements.144 The 1995 OECD recommendation145 includes rules on 
notification, consultations, exchange of non-confidential and confidential information (subject 
to safeguards), traditional and positive comity and a conciliation mechanism to resolve 
disputes.146  
 
       4.3.1 The OECD notification form147 
The OECD’s Competition Law and Policy Committee presented in 1999 a framework for a 
merger notification form. The Committee pointed out that there are actually more similarities 
among nations’ procedural merger rules than there are differences but it was non-the-less 
proposed that countries with an already existing merger review should revise some or all of 
the provisions therein to more adapt to the framework.148 Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
reach consensus on all issues but the framework limited itself to identify the disparate 
approaches taken by different jurisdictions. The result has thus been more a menu of options 
than a pure model form and it has been argued that this might actually increase the diversity 
among merger notification forms if nations relied on the framework when designing their 
merger notification forms.149 So far it does not seem like the framework has influenced 
nations to reach a more convergent approach regarding the notification forms. Even if it was 
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with a valuable aim the framework was introduced, the lack of substantive result cannot be 
too surprising. The members of the OECD are industrialised countries that already have 
enacted competition laws and it is hard to convince competition officials from the developed 
world that they should modify already existing merger review procedures. As will be seen in 
part three, there are other possible solutions to reach a common policy among nations in the 
area of merger that hopefully will be more successful than the OECD notification form.   
 
       4.3.2 International competition rules within the framework of the WTO treaty 
Both the Set and the recommendations of the OECD have the disadvantage of only being non-
binding. There are therefore many that argue that a better and more suitable forum to host an 
agreement on international competition policy should be within the WTO, which is equipped 
with legally binding rules and an effective dispute settlement system. The WTO has also a 
long experience in negotiating agreements acceptable to both the developed and the 
developing world.150 As already mentioned, the EC is strongly in favour of this approach. 
They are supported by some developing countries that feel that a multilateral agreement is 
their only chance to obtain cooperation agreement. These supporters also argue that their 
nations should be provided the same benefits of whatever agreements the developed world 
have negotiated and a multilateral agreement within the WTO would secure this.151  
 
        4.3.3 The EC proposal   
A multilateral agreement on international competition policies should, according to the EC, 
involve several steps. Firstly, nations should domestically adopt a law that bans hardcore 
cartels. This commitment was argued not to pose any significant problem since hardcore 
cartels have detriment effects for all nations and are the most obvious violation of competition 
law. Similar agreements on anticompetitive behaviour of purely domestic character should not 
take place but be at the discretion of each nation. A set of agreed core principles was 
thereafter argued to be adopted. These principles have not been specified in detail but a lot of 
the discussion in the proposal and in the Working Group concerns the principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination, which the EC regards as a necessity in every nation’s 
competition regime. The EC is also of the opinion that a competition committee should be 
established to monitor the competition situation in different nations and the development of 
competition at the global level. The final step would then be to offer technical assistance to 
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countries, which have not yet passed competition legislation. It was also argued by the EC 
that governments’ intervention should not justify wide exemptions from the application of 
nations’ competition law and any exception ought to be specified so as to provide 
transparency for enterprises.152 Many members of the WTO responded to the proposal by 
arguing that exemptions and exceptions would provide the desired flexibility and a possibility 
for nations to achieve other objectives than just enhanced competition, such as industrial and 
economic development. However, they also acknowledged that it was important for any 
exception to be subject to appropriate transparency procedure.153  
 
    4.3.4 The discussion of a multilateral agreement on competition in the Working Group 
The opponents to a multilateral agreement on competition policy argued that it was premature 
to set up a multilateral framework on competition policy since half of the WTO members had 
still not adopted a competition law nor had they put in place a credible competition 
authority.154 Scepticism was expressed over the possibility to effectively incorporate the 
development dimension into a multilateral framework, which many members regarded as an 
important element of such agreement. Moreover, a harmonisation process often meant 
burdensome and difficult steps, which were hard to achieve and therefore the chances for 
adopting this type of agreement were not very high. Doubts were also raised to whether the 
WTO actually had the necessary resources and expertise that was required to host an 
agreement on competition policy. It should also be borne in mind that the WTO was a rule-
making body and not a development or research agency and was therefore not suited to host 
an agreement on competition law.155      
 
The supporters of a multilateral agreement within the WTO responded to the criticism by 
arguing that the WTO was well equipped to host an agreement on competition policy and that 
its expertise in trade issues qualified it to deal with anticompetitive practices with the effect 
on trade and development. There were many examples of how anticompetitive practices 
undermined the gains from trade and development prospects of nations and it was against this 
background evident that there was a need for a multilateral framework on competition policy. 
The wide membership of the organisation was also of advantage when setting up this type of 
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agreement. However, other members argued that the heterogeneous membership could affect 
the proper function and effectiveness of a multilateral framework.156  
               4.3.5 Private barriers to trade  
The discussion in the Working Group does not efficiently cover the problems arising from 
private anticompetitive conducts, including mergers, and how to best regulate such a 
behaviour. It seems that the intention from the beginning was to put more focus on this issue 
than has actually been done. The lack of a proper discussion of the effects of private 
anticompetitive practices to trade, makes the debate in the Working Group hollow and 
incomplete. The discussion by members regarding anticompetitive practices by firms are only 
held on a general basis and indicates problems caused by such practices without explaining 
how a multilateral agreement on competition issues would be an answer to these problems. 
The impression is that the problems with private anticompetitive conduct is too burdensome 
to deal with at the time, and provisions regulating this will just decrease the possibility to 
reach any agreement at all. However, this attitude also has the effect that private 
anticompetitive conduct feels less important and is thereby almost legitimised. It might be that 
the unwillingness to more specifically discuss this topic is a result of the fact that the 
discussion takes place in a WTO context. The Working Group is set up by the WTO, which 
has as its objective to address problems of government intervention to trade. It is not 
customary for the WTO to discuss regulations towards private conduct since this is regarded 
as a matter for each nation to remedy. However, there are some later agreements, which 
contain provisions concerning private parties. The previous mentioned GATS and its article 
VIII provides for members to ensure compliance with WTO disciplines by certain types of 
firms, such as monopolies and exclusive service suppliers and the Telecommunication Annex 
of the GATS, which prohibits discriminatory abuse of dominance and demand reasonable 
access to telephone networks, relate to private business. Both the GATS and TRIPS obliges 
members to, upon request, enter into consultations on restrictive business conduct or the abuse 
of intellectual property rights subject to domestic law and agreements to safeguard 
confidentiality. (Article IX of GATS and article 40 of TRIPS)157 
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The private anticompetitive practices identified by some members as potentially restricting 
trade and development prospects of nations were argued to be both practices that had similar 
and detrimental effects across the markets of many countries, e.g. anticompetitive mergers 
and abuses of dominant position. There could also be situations where a doubtful transaction 
or behaviour had positive effects in one market but had detrimental impact on the markets of 
other countries. Transnational mergers, with beneficial effects in one market but negative 
knock-on effects in others, are examples of when this situation could occur.158  
 
It was also clear from the discussion in the Working Group that from the developing nations’ 
perspective, private and governmental anticompetitive conduct could be favourable and have 
positive effects on the economic development for these countries. Both anticompetitive 
corporate mergers and the discrimination of foreign firms were argued to be able to have this 
effect on developing countries. Developing nations argued that they therefore should be 
exempted from the principle of national treatment in a multilateral agreement on competition 
policy or be provided some degree of flexibility.159  
 
       4.3.6 The relevance of fundamental WTO principles to competition policy  
It was discussed in the Working Group whether it was possible to reinforce the principle of 
non-discrimination and the principle of transparency in a WTO agreement on competition 
policies.160 Especially the usefulness of transparency was underlined since this would ensure 
that the application of the provisions in the agreement was not unnecessarily intrusive. Even if 
it was recognised that increased transparency would generate enhanced costs in form of 
publication of laws, regulations, and guidelines it was non-the-less regarded as a key 
requirement for a credible enforcement system, which outweighed the negative consequences 
of the adherence to the principle.161 Another valuable principle in an agreement on 
competition policy was argued to be the principle of non-discrimination. This principle is 
embedded in the most-favoured nation rule, which states the obligation of a member, that give 
preferential rules to one country, to also grant the same favourable conditions to all other third 
countries. The non-discrimination principle also appears in national treatment provisions in 
GATT and other trade agreements. The principle of national treatment states that a member 
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cannot grant more favourable treatment to national products or services than to corresponding 
product or services from third countries 162  
 
The principle of non-discrimination was suggested, in a multilateral agreement on 
competition policy, to apply only to de jure discrimination, i.e. discrimination embodied in 
laws and regulations and not de facto instances of discrimination.163 It is, however, argued 
that de facto discrimination is as important as discrimination within the legislation since 
anticompetitive practices are a significant problem also in jurisdictions with a comprehensive 
and non-discriminating competition law. As was also argued by a member, most nations’ 
competition laws did not contain discriminatory provisions and was therefore not the main 
cause of the divergent application of nations’ competition laws.164 The principle of non-
discrimination might thus be even more important to de facto discrimination. However, as 
was also pointed out in the Working Group, de facto discrimination is harder to distinguish 
than de jure discrimination since the former often apply to “like” products and services. This 
is an unfamiliar approach for competition law because its application is case-specific and no 
situations are comparable or analogous. It would often be difficult to decide if the behaviour 
was discriminatory or if it was a fair application of the rule of reason in certain market 
conditions or if the application of prosecutorial discretion was based on objective factors.165 
As seen from the discussion on the regulation of private barriers, the debate in the Working 
Group is held on a general basis when issues that would be very difficult to reach a unified 
approach on are discussed, even if these issues might have more relevance than many other 
topics of concern to the Working Group. 
 
       4.3.7 Conclusion 
The discussion in the Working Group can be summarised as a patchwork with faded and ill 
fitted pieces. The topics discussed in each report are not sorted to be only about a relevant 
issue but involves a broad range of subjects in relation to competition and trade, e.g. the effect 
on trade by anticompetitive behaviour, arguments in favour and against a multilateral 
agreement, the effects on developing countries, technical assistance, the possibility to 
reinforce existing WTO principles, and a lot more. The lack of structure in the reports makes 
it difficult to digest the content and it is overall hard to see how progress from the reports can 
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evolve. As a forum for discussion where ideas on competition and trade are shared, it might 
serve a purpose but any further action based on the reports will probably not occur.  
 
There is a wide gap between members that support a multilateral agreement on competition 
policies and members that regard such an agreement as unnecessary. As was pointed out in 
the report of 2001, an agreement on competition policy within the WTO would require a 
consensus among members and so far members are far from reaching any unity on this 
subject.166 However, despite the lack of consensus, there can be no harm discussing the issues 
related to competition and trade if nations believe it is a valuable goal to reach further 
cooperation between the competition authorities and further understanding of nations’ 
competition laws. However, if no significant progress in an international perspective can be 
made in the years to come it will be necessary to ask if these extensive preparations, which 
include several meetings every year between competition officials, contributions in form of 
petitions and resources by members and the adaptation of the material by the secretariat of the 
WTO, and which impose significant costs and bureaucracy to all parties involved, can be 
defended. Hopefully has the discussion in the Working Group enhanced the trust between 
members in competition matters and that cooperation will occur more readily and frequently 
than before, even without the establishment of a multilateral agreement. But with no signed 
agreement, cooperation will of course only be on a voluntary basis and probably to the 
disadvantage of the less industrialised nations. There will be no guarantee that cooperation 
will take place and no nation can rely on another countries willingness to work together to 
avoid anticompetitive behaviour with negative effects world wide or regionally. 
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Part 3 
 
5. Alternative approaches and solutions for further international convergence in 
competition matters 
5.1 Introduction 
Scholars and debaters have identified the need for a multilateral agreement on competition 
policy in many articles. The particular arguments for such an agreement have already been 
developed earlier in this essay. However, the wide support for the multilateral approach is not 
to be found when the discussion concerns alternative forum to host such an agreement. The 
WTO has of course its supporters but there are other interesting proposals that have been 
advanced which provide an interesting input to the debate.  
 
       5.1.1 A mixture of bilateralism and multilateralism 
One interesting proposal is to use the WTO, the OECD and bilateral agreements together to 
solve the problems that are emerging in the field of competition at an international level. This 
is said to be favourable because the characteristics of the forums differ and each body would 
therefore be more suitable to deal with a specific competition problem than the others. A 
mixture of different forums and agreements would then increase the possibilities to deal with 
all the possible international competition problems in a satisfactory way. Bilateral agreements 
with positive comity provision should, according to the proponent, continue to be negotiated 
with the benefit of further enhancing cooperation in international cartel matters and reducing 
conflicts between nations. The OECD should on the other hand create a multilateral 
agreement with the aim of increasing consistency and coordination in other types of 
transnational anticompetitive practices. However, in order to achieve this objective, the 
OECD must be provided substantial autonomy.  
 
It has also been suggested that the conducts that carry the most risks of inconsistent 
assessment by nations’ competition authorities should be addressed in an established work 
program within the OECD. One possible area, which could merit further discussion in the 
program, would be transnational mergers. The hope is that such a work program will increase 
the understanding of the differences in nations’ competition laws and decrease frictions 
between jurisdictions. In addition, competition authorities should engage in consultations with 
each other when multiple competition authorities claim jurisdiction over the same case. The 
WTO is also recognised to play a role in this multiple approach but a more limited one than in 
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the European proposal. A multilateral agreement hosted by the WTO alone has been argued to 
be an unsuccessful approach because it would not be able to deal with the specific features of 
competition laws. Competition rules are formulated generally and their application to specific 
cases has evolved over time. This development and the specific case-by-case approach of 
competition rules could not be considered with a favourable result within the WTO 
framework. An agreement within the WTO would also be influenced by the trade objectives 
of the organisation and focus would therefore be on the market-access norms of the trade 
system and less attention would be awarded to the consumer welfare norms.167  
 
       5.1.2 Principles of constitutional measures 
Professor Eleanor Fox is also strongly in favour of a multilateral agreement on competition 
policy but she suggests that such an agreement should include principles of “constitutional 
measures”. She argues that this would add strength and content to the general concept of 
nations’ competition provisions. Principles of constitutional generality could also prohibit 
international cartels and anticompetitive blockage of market access, while in the same time 
provide a discipline for trade-restraining practices by nations. Another of her proposals is to 
provide a modest extension of the WTO obligations. A multilateral agreement on competition 
law should thus oblige members to prevent market closure caused by private parties as well as 
public restraints. The agreement should include a choice of law principle, which will apply to 
mergers, monopoly and market access cases.168 In another article she proposes different more 
or less far-reaching steps that should be taken in order to facilitate the merger review process 
and to reach consistency between nations’ assessment of mergers. The steps suggested ar, 
among others, that nations should treat anticompetitive harms within the community of 
contracting parties in the multilateral framework as severely as harm within the territory of 
the nation’s border. A common premerger form should also be established, which provides for 
the merging parties at their own discretion to use a central filing system for mergers with 
international dimensions. The notification procedure should thereby be coordinated so all 
contracting parties will use the same waiting periods. Exception to certain anticompetitive 
transactions would probably be demanded by members in order for them to adhere to the 
framework. It would also be necessary for the authorisation process of anticompetitive 
mergers to be transparent, with the criteria used to grant the merger clearly stated. Moreover, 
gains from anticompetitive conduct to non-nationals as well as to nationals should not be 
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taken into consideration when assessing the merger. However, it is not likely that an efficient 
central filing system will be established if not the parties to the transactions agree to waive 
confidentiality.169 The issue of confidentiality is thus another problem that needs to be further 
discussed.  
 
       5.1.3 Increased Transparency 
Other authors have also underlined the importance of transparency in the application of 
nations’ merger review provisions. One way to achieve enhanced transparency was argued to 
be the issuing of guidelines that explain the manner in which the rules are applied and 
publication of changes in relevant legislation, regulation and policy approaches. This step 
would be particularly useful for the business community but also to the enforcers. After 
having reached greater understanding of nations’ merger review procedures the next task 
should be to develop common principles for the merger review. Both the WTO and the OECD 
have been suggested as suitable for this work. However, it should not be mandatory rules but 
a list of principles that countries with no antitrust legislation today could use as a model when 
establishing a merger regime. Procedural convergence is thus thought, seen in a longer 
perspective, to contribute to further substantive convergence.170 The proposal seems a bit 
passé since the OECD already has introduced a list with possible rules to be used for nations 
that either want to renew their merger regulations or for nations with no competition law. The 
hoped progress from the 1998 filing form has not yet occurred and it therefore seems that the 
WTO might be a better host for this type of agreement. The fact that the OECD is not 
regarded as a high status organisation from nations’ ministries (compared to the WTO, where 
trade and finance ministries are responsible for the discussion) is also an aspect to the 
disadvantage of the OECD.171 It is therefore easy to understand that many regard the chances 
for progress, in form of a multiple merger review as well as an agreement in other areas of 
competition, greater if the agreements are under the auspices of the WTO rather than the 
OECD.  
 
       5.1.4 National Treatment Principle 
A way to reduce the risks of conflict when nations apply their competition law 
extraterritorially has been suggested to be through the application of the national treatment 
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principle. This approach seems to have a great potential, especially for the reduction of 
conflicts in competition matters between the developed countries. Nations often allow 
anticompetitive practices by their nationals when such behaviour takes place abroad even if 
the practices are prohibited and sometimes criminally when occurring within its own 
territory.172 The national treatment obligation would here mean that the competition law of 
firms’ home nation follows them when they conduct business abroad. The developed world 
would probably feel they are on the loosing side in this proposal since their firms will be 
constrained more than firms from countries with loose or no competition law.173 It is however 
argued that this approach still is appealing because it would satisfy the demanded flexibility 
that, in particular the developing nations, have argued for in the Working Group.  
 
For developing nations a comprehensive competition law might actually reduce the economic 
development because too much competitive pressure may discourage investment. Besides, in 
the initial stage of economic development it might be appropriate to use industrial policy tools 
to promote growth and development due to the incomplete markets or because of the limited 
size of the local economy. However, in the same time a lack of competitive pressure, where 
nation permit rent seeking activities, will reduce the economic progress. It has therefore been 
argued that an optimal level of competition for the developing nations is preferable rather than 
the maximum degree, which is more useful for already developed countries. The EC has in 
the Working Group suggested that the scope of the competition law should be limited for 
countries at the initial level of economic development in order to achieve the equilibrium 
between the degrees of comprehensive competition law.174  
 
Another way to achieve the desired flexibility for developing nations could be to provide 
them with specified exemptions from the obligation of an agreement on competition policy. 
However, it may be difficult to enact exemptions only applicable for some parties to an 
agreement. There will be definitional questions; e.g. what should be the criteria for a nation at 
the “initial level of economic development”.  A national treatment obligation thus seems 
beneficial also in this context. However, there is a risk that the developing nations will lose 
the incentive to enact competition provisions and prefer not to have a competition law at all, 
as long as they are subject to the national treatment obligation and are a player at the export 
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market. China and many other Asian countries are examples of nations that probably would 
gain from a national treatment provision as well as those nations that have desired raw 
materials to export. The one that has the most to lose from a national treatment obligation has 
been argued to be the EC. The EC, which compared with the US, has a more rigid 
competition law would have a disadvantage when conducting business abroad if their firms 
had to apply the competition law of the EC even in other jurisdictions. There is however a 
disadvantage with a national treatment obligation, notably that it neglects the impact that 
private parties to trade have and that anticompetitive behaviour by private firms is as a 
significant problem as governments’ intervention.175  
 
       5.1.5 WTO Premerger Office 
A slightly unusual proposal suggests that a premerger control office should be established 
within the framework of the WTO. The WTO premerger office should have the power to 
review some international mergers. However, in contrast to previous attempts of establishing 
a common notification procedure, the WTO premerger office should only identify these 
jurisdictions where a particular merger does not constitute a threat to competition and nations 
would consequently not be prevented from reviewing cases with significant political value. 
The proposal would therefore only have limited effects on nations’ sovereignty. The 
proponent suggests that the WTO Premerger Office should have competence to assess 
mergers that are notified in more than one jurisdiction and which are voluntarily notified by 
the parties. They would thereafter be able to choose if they wish to submit filings in each of 
those identified jurisdictions or if they want to submit one filing to the WTO Premerger 
Office. The parties must notify to the Premerger Office before they notify the national 
agencies. There would otherwise be a risk that the opinion of the national competition 
authorities would influence the decision of the WTO Premerger Office. The parties would be 
obliged to abide the decision reached by the WTO Premerger Office.  
 
In order for the system to be efficient, nations would have to refrain from reviewing a 
transaction that had been reviewed by the WTO Premerger Office. The risk of forum 
shopping would be avoided since the WTO Premerger Office only would review transactions 
with no anticompetitive effects in a particular jurisdiction. In order for the effectiveness of the 
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Premerger Office, the Office will be empowered to grant exemptions for cases with certain 
legitimate reasons.176 
 
This proposal offers a more limited approach by the WTO and it is therefore interesting. It is 
also true that national competition authorities are assessing transactions by parties that file just 
to be sure, even if there is no threat to competition. This consumes the scare resources of the 
competition authorities. However, it is not sure that even such a modest proposal would be 
accepted by the parties to the WTO because it non-the-less prevents nations from assessing 
cases that may affect their jurisdiction. There are many scholars that argue for common 
premerger notification forms like the once offered by the OECD, and this would evidently be 
useful. However, as mentioned above, these forms have so far not been successful and it 
would be preferable if debaters tried to see other possibilities like the different proposal of 
establishing a WTO Premerger Office. Even if there theoretically exist many options for 
creating further international cooperation in the field of competition, it would be desirably if 
more focus was given to proposals that potentially could create a difference. With the strong 
aversion against mulitilateralism from some countries, only limited approaches that in very 
modest way impair nations’ sovereignty could lead to some progress towards the valuable of 
international rules on competition, and it is therefore only those proposals that are of real 
interest.    
 
6. Final Remarks 
The debate of establishing international competition rules has become more intensified due to 
the ongoing trade liberalisation and the globalisation process. As trade barriers fall nations 
may wish to use their competition law arbitrarily so as to camouflage protectionism or engage 
in anticompetitive practices to limit the effects of the trade liberalisation. The likelihood for 
rent shifting practices is perhaps not too surprising since competition in general terms is a 
means to attain higher national efficiency. Some form of convergence of nations’ competition 
rules would probably restrain the ability to replace the tariff barriers with new barriers in form 
of anticompetitive practices. In the same time a similar drafted competition law between 
nations would reduce conflicts and increase the legal certainty for businesses.  
 
There is a wide acceptance among governments that further cooperation in the field of 
competition is needed in order to enhance the economic development of nations. Despite this, 
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there is no genuine willingness to create a forceful cooperation agreement on competition. It 
seems that some nations feel that they would lose more on a multilateral agreement on 
competition policy than by preserving the system used today, i.e. the use of bilateral 
agreements and soft harmonisation (even if the option with bilateral agreements is not 
available to all nations). The US is one nation that supports the development towards further 
cooperation in the field of competition but argues that such a development should be through 
bilateral agreements. The objections towards a multilateral agreement on international 
competition rules by some nations might be caused by their interest to use rent shifting 
practices, which in a multilateral agreement would amount to anticompetitive behaviour and 
thereby be prohibited. They would therefore be constrained by such an agreement and their 
sovereignty would be limited.  
 
It is difficult to understand how the strong support for some form of agreement and enhanced 
cooperation by nations in the field of competition has not yet resulted in a significant change. 
One explanation might be that nations support this development out of different reasons. The 
US has for example a strong tradition of enforcing its competition law extraterritoriality but in 
the same time allow practices by national firms abroad, that if it had taken place within its 
jurisdiction, would have been anticompetitive. Despite the fact that this attitude is very 
contradictory and shows a kind of double standard, it may also be an indication that nations 
want to preserve their competition laws as a tool to direct behaviour both within a nation but 
also outside its own jurisdiction. The competition law would in these cases be applied as a 
means to shift away profits from neighbours. This behaviour is in clear opposition to the 
expressed positive view of governments that international competition policies or at least 
further cooperation in this area should be developed.  
 
If the US really sees competition law as such a tool, the support for further international 
cooperation in competition matters cannot be based on the wish to reduce rent shifting 
practices. Instead the US might regard further cooperation as a way to achieve consistency in 
nations’ competition analysis. It is argued that this purpose of international competition policy 
is more limited than the objective to reduce rent shifting practices. A nation with the former 
view probably feels it is enough to just establish cooperation through bilateral agreements, 
which could be argued to be supported by the observation that conflicts over differences in the 
assessment of competition cases occur mostly between nations with comprehensive 
competition laws, i.e. developed countries. Bilateral agreements are mostly concluded 
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between nations in a similar stage of development and are built on reciprocity, and the 
prevention of inconsistent application of competition cases could, to a certain extent, be 
solved by bilateral agreements. Nations with no competition law or with lax enforcement 
policies will not assess too many international competition cases and it is therefore limited 
risks for political conflicts between those nations and others that also feel they have 
jurisdiction to assess the cases. However, those countries may still cause conflicts from a 
competition and trade spectrum since the lack of competition law or lax enforcement of such 
law will probably enhance the likelihood for rent shifting practices. 
 
However, if one wants to cover both of two mentioned problems; rent shifting practices and 
inconsistent analysis, or to, e.g. reduce the possibility to arbitrarily use nations’ competition 
rules, facilitate for the business community to comply with all nations’ antitrust law, to 
increase legal certainty, to reduce political conflicts and irritation over competition matters, 
and to prevent anticompetitive practices by private firms, it would be beneficial to have a 
multilateral agreement on competition policy. Especially the question of anticompetitive 
behaviour by private firms is interesting and the intention was initially to put more focus on 
this issue. However, the discussion in the Working Group concerning international 
competition policies has effectively avoided the issue of private anticompetitive practices, 
with the consequence that anticompetitive practices by private bodies feel less important. This 
is in reality not true and it is argued that as the reduction of trade barriers continues, 
anticompetitive practices by firms will become more obvious and consequently “forces” itself 
on the agenda. It might then be that the WTO is not the right forum to discuss issues like 
competition, as some scholars have argued. The attention on governments’ anticompetitive 
practices in the Working Group may be a result of the general objective of the WTO, notably 
to address problems concerning governmental behaviour related to trade issues. However, in 
this initial stage it does not matter so much where the discussion takes place as long as there is 
some form of communication on the subject. The discussion would however, in order to reach 
a broad acceptance, preferable take place within a multilateral forum with world wide 
membership. The WTO is therefore the most natural host for an agreement on international 
competition policy, despite its history as a trade organisation.  
 
It is possible to argue that the time is not right to introduce another multilateral agreement 
embedded in the WTO. As has been shown on several occasions over the last couple of years, 
there are many voices against the globalisation process. To have an agreement on 
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international competition rules within the WTO, which by many is regarded as a club only for 
rich countries, will perhaps add another problem to the organisation and might affect the 
success of such an agreement. It is argued, however, that international competition rules 
within the WTO, will be beneficial for both the developed and developing world, if suitable 
flexibility is provided for developing nations. The resistance towards globalisation from some 
people should not be the argument that prevents such an agreement from occurring.  
 
It is not likely that there will be any agreement on international competition rules in the near 
future. The aversion of the US against multilateralism is effectively hindering any far-
reaching agreement on the issue and the way to work towards further cooperation will 
probably be through bilateral agreements. However, the discussion on how to create an 
international agreement on competition rules should continue but preferably limit itself to 
only realistically and thereby not too extensive solutions.  
 
One form of anticompetitive behaviour, which clearly may have effects in several 
jurisdictions and is therefore often scrutinised by several competition authorities, are 
transnational mergers. Any form of multilateral assessment enhances the risk of inconsistent 
outcomes and thereby also political conflicts. Especially the case of Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas illustrates how sensitive the application of merger control rules is to political 
interference. Since nations sometimes have different opinions of what amount to 
anticompetitive behaviour, mergers assessed by several competition authorities will often be 
approved in some jurisdictions but prohibited in others. The elements assessed in a nation’s 
competition analysis are often difficult for foreigners to understand and sometimes they 
cannot be objectively defined. This opens up for accusations that nations use their competition 
law so as to camouflage protectionism and creates confusion for firms when conducting 
business in several jurisdictions. The conflicts over international competition matters could be 
reduced if there was one “right” purpose of competition law and all behaviour that prevented 
that purpose could then be defined as anticompetitive. However, there is no objective 
definition of anticompetitive practices and competition may serve many objectives. The 
merger law of the US emphasises the creation of efficiencies to the benefit of the consumers, 
while the EC is encompassing other objectives as well in their competition law.  
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It is astonishing that there are so many critical voices against the Commission’s view 
regarding economic reasoning in the analysis of mergers. It is argued that competition law 
could not totally be separated from the effects the application of that law will create for the 
society as a whole and in a longer perspective. Even if a merger creates efficiency (which of 
course many mergers will) the consequences in a longer perspective can be detrimental both 
to the consumers and the society even if there is short term benefits. As long as there is an 
openness about what objectives the competition authority takes into consideration when 
applying its competition policy and as long as there is a consistent approach, it cannot be 
objectionable to include other objectives than just the creation of economic efficiency in a 
nation’s competition policy. The problem is that the assessment of merger cases are not 
always transparent, partly out of confidentiality reasons, partly because it is convenient for a 
competition authority to briefly conclude that a transaction was procompetitive out of 
efficiency gains. Other times the authority may prohibit a merger because of interest to other 
policy objectives, without in detail specify the particular gains or all factors embedded in the 
decision. Since it is often difficult to objectively define “industrial policy reasons” this notion 
may be overused and misused. An international agreement on competition policy could then 
have the benefit of specifying the elements of nations’ competition analysis. The difficult part 
will of course be to reach a compromise between the application of economic considerations 
and the application of other policy objectives. The EC and the US now seem to approach each 
other regarding their competition analysis and this may facilitate the process towards a 
common standard regarding international competition policies. However, for this to be a real 
possibility, nations must refrain from hiding behind the notion of sovereignty and to be fully 
committed to work towards further cooperation in this area, preferably on a multilateral level.  
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